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WHATEVER DID  HAPPEN  TO  THE
ANTITRUST MOVEMENT?
Herbert Hovenkamp*
INTRODUCTION: MOVEMENT ANTITRUST
Antitrust in the United States today is caught between its pursuit of tech-
nical rules designed to define and implement defensible economic goals,
and increasingly political calls for a new antitrust “movement.”  The goals of
this movement have been variously defined as combatting industrial concen-
tration, limiting the economic or political power of large firms, correcting
the maldistribution of wealth, controlling high profits, increasing wages, or
protecting small business.  None of those goals is new.1  They have appeared
and reappeared in the history of United States antitrust policy.  Among the
articulated goals of movement antitrust, low consumer prices often go
unmentioned.2
In the 1960s, the policy historian Richard Hofstadter lamented the pass-
ing of the antitrust “movement” as one of the “faded passions of American
© 2018 Herbert Hovenkamp.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame
Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* James G. Dinan University Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School and
the Wharton School.
1 For example, the history of anticoncentration rhetoric is voluminous and more than
a century old. See William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain
Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1989);
Harry First, Woodstock Antitrust 3–4 (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 18-24, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3180878.  On the early history, see generally MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE
CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890–1916 (1988), and HANS B.
THORELLI, The FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 54–96, 235–308 (1955).  Louis Brandeis spoke
forcefully about these issues. See generally THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1934) (including a collection of his papers
dating back to the 1912 presidential election).  On the extent to which the current neo-
Brandeis movement restates earlier movements, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Con-
sumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?, 44 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter
Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle], https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3197329.
2 See Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle, supra note 1, (manuscript at
2).
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reform.”3  In its early history, he observed, antitrust had a powerful move-
ment quality but very few accomplishments in the courts.  Later, it ceased to
be a movement just as it was attaining litigation success.  Hofstadter’s essay
appeared in a book entitled The Paranoid Style in American Politics.4  He later
explained that title as invoking “the sense of heated exaggeration, suspicious-
ness, and conspiratorial fantasy” that characterized movement politics in the
United States.5  Antitrust was no exception.
At about the same time, Robert H. Bork and Ward Bowman published
another well-known essay addressing many of the same issues, although from
a different perspective.  In The Crisis in Antitrust 6 they complained that anti-
trust was forever “vacillat[ing] between the policy of preserving competition
and the policy of preserving competitors from their more energetic and effi-
cient rivals.”7  The result, they argued, was a haphazard mix of intelligent
rules governing practices such as naked price fixing, together with senseless
overly aggressive rules against imagined exclusionary practices,8 and even
condemning mergers simply because they produced cost savings.9
Bork borrowed heavily from this article when he wrote The Antitrust Para-
dox, which was published a little over a decade later.10  There he noted anti-
trust’s very considerable rhetorical popularity,11 but along with it a lack of
fundamental understanding of antitrust law’s economic purpose and effects,
even among its practitioners.12  At the same time, he observed that “[t]here
has always existed in this country a populist hostility to big business, a hostil-
3 Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID
STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188 (1st ed. 1965).  The essay is reprinted in
THE MAKING OF COMPETITION POLICY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC SOURCES (Daniel A. Crane &
Herbert Hovenkamp eds., 2013).  Hofstadter’s essay originally appeared in THE BUSINESS
ESTABLISHMENT 113 (Earl F. Cheit ed., 1964).
4 Hofstadter, supra note 3.
5 See Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, HARPER’S MAG., Nov.
1964, at 77, 77, https://archive.harpers.org/1964/11/pdf/HarpersMagazine-1964-11-
0014706.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AK]AJUM7PFZHQ4PMJ4LA&Expires=1540561655&Signa
ture=Tfsnu99SlXmG0YaVHTQIc3iks54%3D.
6 Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363
(1965) [hereinafter Bork & Bowman, Crisis in Antitrust].  The article was based on an essay
that initially appeared in Fortune magazine.  Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman Jr., The
Crisis in Antitrust, FORTUNE, Dec. 1963, at 138.
7 Bork & Bowman, Crisis in Antitrust, supra note 6, at 363–64.
8 Id. at 366.
9 Id. at 373.
10 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978) [hereinafter BORK, ANTITRUST
PARADOX].  Bork even borrowed some phrases from the earlier article.  For example, Bork
and Bowman referred to “the crash of antitrust merger” policy in the 1960s, referring
mainly to Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.  Bork & Bowman, Crisis in Antitrust, supra note 6,
at 370.  This inspired the title of chapter nine of BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra at
198–216.
11 BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 10, at 3.
12 Id.
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ity that is currently reinforced by the suspicion that major corporations are
somehow to blame for hardships that have their origin elsewhere.”13
Hofstadter’s, Bowman’s, and Bork’s observations capture one of anti-
trust law’s most enduring disconnects.  On the one side is its “movement”
quality, reflected by politicians and popular media as an appeal for a stronger
and broader set of antitrust rules that are better able to serve the American
economy’s various constituencies.  Often movement participants lack a seri-
ous understanding of economics and have wildly unrealistic expectations
about what competition policy can accomplish, as well as inconsistent and
even incoherent goals.  Often accompanying this is considerable distrust and
paranoia, much of it leveled at big business.14
On the other side are antitrust’s much duller technical rules, driven by
concerns for due process, economic efficiency, administrability, and
testability.  In contrast to the antitrust movement, Hofstadter observed, “the
antitrust enterprise, as an institutional reality, now runs its quiet course with-
out much public attention, and we lose sight of it.”15  He lamented that “[i]n
the very years when it lost compelling public interest the antitrust enterprise
became a force of real consequence in influencing the behavior of
business.”16
While Hofstadter, Bork, and Bowman might all seem like so much
ancient history, their characterization of antitrust’s dilemma is particularly
relevant today.  If anything, it more accurately describes the situation in the
twenty-first century than it did when they were writing.  Over the last fifty
years antitrust has become much more technical, particularly in areas such as
merger enforcement and exclusionary behavior, but also in more collateral
areas such as assessing causation and measuring damages.  As its technical
competence has increased, its “movement” quality has faded into the back-
ground or become political noise.  Simultaneously, technical antitrust has
become less interesting to politicians, who cannot win elections by talking
about the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index or average variable cost.
As a movement, antitrust often succeeds at capturing political attention
and engaging at least some voters, but it fails at making effective or even
coherent policy.  The result is goals that are unmeasurable and fundamen-
tally inconsistent, although with their contradictions rarely exposed.  Among
the most problematic contradictions is the one between small business pro-
tection and consumer welfare.  In a nutshell, consumers benefit from low
prices, high output, and high quality and variety of products and services.
But when a firm or a technology is able to offer these things they invariably
injure rivals, typically those who are smaller or heavily invested in older tech-
nologies.  Although movement antitrust rhetoric is often opaque about spe-
cifics, its general effect is invariably to encourage higher prices or reduced
output or innovation, mainly for the protection of small business or those
13 Id. at 5.
14 See Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle, supra note 1.
15 Hofstadter, supra note 3, at 189.
16 Id. at 190.
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whose technology or other investments have become obsolete.  Indeed, that
has been a predominant feature of movement antitrust ever since the Sher-
man Act was passed, and it remains a prominent feature of movement anti-
trust today.  Indeed, some spokespersons for movement antitrust write, as
Louis Brandeis did, as if low prices are the evil that antitrust law should be
combatting.17
Nevertheless, mantras such as “industrial concentration” or “big busi-
ness” have great political force.  These terms provide almost nothing in the
way of administrable rules while yet evoking an image of something big, bad,
and powerful that government must bring under control.  For example, here
is the plank of the 2016 Democratic Party’s platform on antitrust:
Large corporations have concentrated their control over markets to a
greater degree than Americans have seen in decades—further evidence that
the deck is stacked for those at the top.  Democrats will take steps to stop
corporate concentration in any industry where it is unfairly limiting competi-
tion.  We will make competition policy and antitrust stronger and more
responsive to our economy today, enhance the antitrust enforcement arms
of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), and encourage other agencies to police anti-competitive practices in
their areas of jurisdiction.
We support the historic purpose of the antitrust laws to protect competi-
tion and prevent excessively consolidated economic and political power,
which can be corrosive to a healthy democracy.  We support reinvigorating
DOJ and FTC enforcement of antitrust laws to prevent abusive behavior by
dominant companies, and protecting the public interest against abusive, dis-
criminatory, and unfair methods of commerce.  We support President
Obama’s recent Executive Order, directing all agencies to identify specific
actions they can take in their areas of jurisdiction to detect anticompetitive
practices—such as tying arrangements, price fixing, and exclusionary con-
duct—and to refer practices that appear to violate federal antitrust law to
the DOJ and FTC.18
The antitrust plank never references low consumer prices, or anything
having to do with product quality.  That is not because Democrats are not
interested in low consumer prices.19  Rather, they apparently believe that
antitrust has little to do with it.  The references to prices occur in other sec-
tions of the platform, devoted to such subjects as health and safety and the
high price of pharmaceutical drugs.  Those sections make no reference to
17 See infra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
18 DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM COMM., 2016 DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM 11 (2016),
https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2016_DNC_Platform.pdf [hereinaf-
ter DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM].
19 Cf. Senator Elizabeth Warren, Keynote Remarks at New America’s Open Markets
Program Event: Reigniting Competition in the American Economy (June 29, 2016),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2016-6-29_Warren_Antitrust_Speech.pdf
(discussing competition, rather than low market prices, while speaking about antitrust).
Senator Warren, however, expresses a strong concern about consumer prices and product
and service quality. Id. at 2.
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antitrust law.20  The only references to “consumers” occur in planks pertain-
ing to unionization, affordable housing, Wall Street, banks and Dodd-Frank,
and clean energy.21  So according to the platform, while legal policy gener-
ally is concerned with high consumer prices, antitrust policy apparently is
not.  By contrast, the 2016 Republican platform never references antitrust,
although it does contain a plank promoting a “competitive America,” but
focused entirely on lowering tax rates.22
The antitrust plank in the 2016 Democrat platform is actually one of the
most detailed to appear in any platform by a major political party.23  The
catchphrases that it uses, however—“corporate concentration,” “unfairly lim-
iting competition,” or “abusive behavior by dominant companies”—can
mean practically anything depending on assumptions.  The platform is pep-
pered with references to “fair” or “fairness,” including the antitrust plank,
but with no reference point indicating how fairness should be assessed.  Is it
“fair” that consumers be asked to pay high prices in order to accommodate
the shortcomings of some businesses; or conversely, is it “fair” that small busi-
nesses suffer simply because they are not able to compete with larger firms
on price or quality; or is it “fair” that firms heavily invested in old brick-and-
mortar distribution lose out to more technologically entrepreneurial firms?
“Fairness” as an antitrust concern means nothing without a reference point
or set of measurement tools.
As for specific practices, the antitrust plank in the Democrat platform
singles out “tying arrangements, price fixing, and exclusionary conduct,” say-
ing nothing about mergers, other vertical restraints, or anticompetitive pat-
ent practices.  In fact, the platform never mentions patents, although it
makes frequent references to innovation, largely in the context of proposed
government intervention to stimulate production24 or to finance research
and development and educate people for more technically demanding
jobs.25  Of the three anticompetitive practices that it singles out, “price fix-
ing” is completely uncontroversial and has always been a central focus of
nearly every articulation of antitrust policy, left, center, and right—including
in Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox.26  The term “exclusionary conduct” is so
vague that it is meaningless.  Both socially harmful and socially beneficial
20 DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, supra note 18, at 30, 32.
21 Id. at 4, 5, 10, 24–25.
22 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016, at 2 (2016), https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/
documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]-ben_1468872234.pdf.
23 The full text of major party platforms dating back to 1840 can be found at National
Political Party Platforms: Parties Receiving Electoral Votes 1840–2016, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/platforms.php (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).  For a history
of antitrust planks in major party platforms, see The Monopoly Issue in Party Politics, CQ
RESEARCHER (July 7, 1936), http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.
php?id=CQresrre1936070700.
24 E.g., DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, supra note 18, at 7 (stimulating a “manufacturing ren-
aissance”); id. at 12 (innovation and trade agreements).
25 See id. at 31–32 (innovation and universal healthcare; reducing drug costs).
26 BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 10, at 66–67, 292–95.
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conduct can be “exclusionary.”  The inclusion of “tying arrangements” is mys-
tifying.  Tying is ubiquitous in modern economies and is an essential charac-
teristic of networks and technology.27  Further, the vast majority of it is
procompetitive because it increases output without excluding anyone.
Finally, the number of antitrust tying cases is small in comparison with
merger cases, which make up a large portion of antitrust enforcement activ-
ity.  A major party platform that identifies “tying arrangements” but not
“mergers” as a fundamental concern requires an explanation.  Most impor-
tantly, it seems to miss the whole point of competitive markets, which is to
produce a high output of quality, competitively priced goods.
At least in part, the Democratic Party platform reflects the reappearance
of movement antitrust.  While it is hardly the only expression, and certainly
not the most extreme, it represents a troublesome development—namely,
the idea that America needs higher prices in order to give smaller firms a fair
chance.  The platform also gives a reader the strong impression that its slo-
gans were selected in order to achieve maximum political traction with the
illiterati, and perhaps that is all that can be expected of a political platform.
In the process, however, it does antitrust policy a great disservice by making
its legitimate targets almost impossible to define and not providing ammuni-
tion for attacking them when they are defined.  Its supporters generally dis-
parage the use of economics, sometimes suggesting that antitrust policy
should be governed by political theory instead.28  Exactly how political theory
gets one to specific antitrust rules is not completely clear, but it involves
excluding the opinions of antitrust experts concerning the public’s
interest.29
Movement antitrust argues variously for abandoning the measurement
of competition by reference to output and price,30 or even abandoning con-
sumer welfare as an antitrust proscription altogether.31  It accuses retailers
such as Amazon of engaging in “predatory pricing” without providing a
27 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Design of Production, 103 CORNELL L. REV.
1155 (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3013122.
28 See Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle, supra note 1, (manuscript at
17); Zephyr Teachout & Lina Khan, Market Structure and Political Law: A Taxonomy of Power,
9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 70–72 (2014).
29 See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, The Ideological Roots of America’s Market Power Problem, 127 YALE
L.J.F. 960, 964–65, 965 n.20 (2018).
30 See Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 716 (2017); see
also David Dayen, The Rehabilitation of Antitrust, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 22, 2017), http://pro
spect.org/article/rehabilitation-antitrust; Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, The Rise, Fall,
and Rebirth of the U.S. Antitrust Movement, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://hbr.org/
2017/12/the-rise-fall-and-rebirth-of-the-u-s-antitrust-movement.
31 See, e.g., Barry C. Lynn, Exec. Dir., Open Markets Inst., The Consumer Welfare Stan-
dard in Antitrust: Outdated or a Harbor in a Sea of Doubt?, Testimony before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary: Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition, and Consumer
Rights (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12-13-17%20
Lynn%20Testimony.pdf.
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coherent definition of the practice.32  It never explains how a nonmanufac-
turing retailer such as Amazon could ever recover its investment in below-
cost pricing by later raising prices, and even disputes that raising prices to
higher levels ever needs to be a part of the strategy, thus indicating that it is
confusing predation with investment.33  Charging low but profitable prices
indefinitely is not unlawful “predatory pricing”‘ nor is forcing suppliers to
price competitively.
The movement antitrust attack on “consumer welfare” reflects both a
misunderstanding of that term, and an exaggeration of its influence on
recent antitrust jurisprudence.  This point is critical because much of move-
ment antitrust blames the consumer welfare principle for the current state of
antitrust law.  Consumer welfare as it is properly used today refers to the wel-
fare of consumers as consumers, pure and simple.34  Speaking objectively,
consumer welfare is improved by high output and low prices, as well as high
quality.  Under this definition the welfare of producers, competitors, or any-
one other than consumers who might be affected by a practice is ignored.  In
addition to its substantive advantages, this principle has a powerful adminis-
trative advantage: it does not require courts to compute welfare “tradeoffs,”
because there is nothing to trade off.35
In sharp contrast, Robert Bork very famously used the term “consumer
welfare” when he was really referring to the combined welfare of both pro-
ducers and consumers.36  He observed that an economic tradeoff occurs
when a supplier practice causes monopolistic increases in consumer prices
but also reduces the supplier’s costs.37  Most peculiarly, for Bork the word
“consumer” referred to suppliers as well as customers.38  For Bork, a practice
that generated one hundred dollars in seller profits but buyer losses of sixty
dollars would be counted as a net improvement of “consumer welfare.”  Bork
also believed, however, that actual computation of welfare tradeoffs in indi-
vidual cases would be too difficult.  Further, an attempt to do so would over-
look important efficiencies.  Rather, efficiencies should be presumed, even
32 Khan, supra note 30, at 722–24; id. at 753 (preferring growth over profits is a form
of predatory pricing); id. at 759 (suggesting that loss leader pricing is a form of predatory
pricing).
33 See id. at 729–30.
34 See Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard?
Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 336 (2010).
35 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Efficiencies, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 703,
719–21 (2017) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Efficiencies]; Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 119 (2018) [hereinafter Hovenkamp,
The Rule of Reason].
36 See Salop, supra note 34, at 347.  For an illuminating discussion of Bork’s use of the
term, see Daniel A. Crane, The Tempting of Antitrust: Robert Bork and the Goals of Antitrust
Policy, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 835, 845–47 (2014).
37 See BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 10, at 107.
38 Id. at 108 (observing that “consumers” have both suffered from “lost output” but
have also gained in resource saving from the cost reduction; however, the latter gains
accrue to the producers, not to the purchasers).
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when the challenged practice creates market power.39  That presumption of
efficiency without proof is one of the most controversial aspects of Bork’s
approach to the welfare question.
These two understandings of consumer welfare have produced a troub-
lesome ambiguity in antitrust law ever since.  For example, some of those
who write in movement antitrust today attribute the consumer welfare princi-
ple to Bork,40 and as a result blame it for higher prices that accrue to produc-
ers.  But the important thing is that high producer profits for Bork was part
of the consumer welfare that antitrust law should produce.
This ambiguity about definition has also affected Supreme Court usage
of “consumer welfare.”  The Supreme Court has never categorically
embraced any particular definition of consumer welfare, even though it has
used the term several times.  Six majority opinions speak of consumer wel-
fare.  Two were quotations from Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox, suggesting that
the Court was either speaking of producer welfare as well, or else that it did
not appreciate the difference between Bork’s definition and true consumer
welfare.41  Plaintiffs won both cases, however, and the holdings are consistent
with true consumer welfare.  Indeed, in one of them, Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
the Supreme Court held that end-use consumers had standing to pursue
price fixing, making it an important consumer welfare decision.42
Of the remaining four uses, two involved predatory pricing cases observ-
ing that consumer welfare would be enhanced by a period of below-cost pric-
ing that was not followed by recoupment of losses through subsequent higher
prices.43  That would very likely be true.  An unsuccessful attempt at preda-
tory pricing would result in lower consumer prices temporarily, but no subse-
quent period of high prices.  The final uses of consumer welfare are related
to the Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. decision holding that
some instances of resale price maintenance may promote consumer welfare.
The first was Leegin itself44 and the second was Ohio v. American Express Co.,
making essentially the same observation.45  That could also be true under
either definition of consumer welfare.
39 Id. at 107–10, 128–29.
40 E.g., Lynn, supra note 31; see also David McLaughlin, Forget Consumer Welfare. This
Antitrust Movement Targets Power Instead, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 17, 2018), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-17/forget-consumer-welfare-this-antitrust-
movement-targets-power-instead.
41 See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting BORK, ANTITRUST
PARADOX, supra note 10, at 66) (granting standing to consumers in price fixing case);
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (quoting Reiter, 422
U.S. at 343) (condemning output restriction under rule of reason).
42 Reiter, 442 U.S. 330.
43 See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 324
(2007); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993).
44 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889 (2007).
45 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2290 (2018) (citing Leegin, 551 U.S. at
890–91).
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Four additional usages of the term are in dissents.46  Finally, the term
appeared in Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in the Jefferson Parish Hos-
pital District No. 2 v. Hyde tying case.  Justice Brennan observed that some ties
could impair horizontal competition, injuring consumer welfare.47  A few
other cases never use the phrase “consumer welfare” but do speak more gen-
erally about benefits to consumers.48  None of these Supreme Court deci-
sions distinguish the Bork definition of consumer welfare from the true
consumer welfare position.  Beyond the Supreme Court, the strongest case
for application of a consumer welfare principle is in merger law under the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which embrace a consumer welfare principle
to the extent that they tie merger policy to the effect on output and con-
sumer prices.49
One of the most disturbing things about movement antitrust is its indif-
ference or even disparagement of low consumer prices.  Without citing any
evidence, some of its protagonists proclaim that most Americans are not con-
cerned with high prices that might result from monopoly, but rather with
“loss of their properties, hence their independence, even their dignity.”50
They recommend harsh rules against vertical integration without ever stating
a test, other than a very general suggestion that vertical integration leads to
leveraging and foreclosure.51  They call for a return to the merger enforce-
ment standards expressed in the 1968 Merger Guidelines—for example,
blocking any merger between a firm with fifteen percent of a market and any
other firm whose market share is one percent or more.  The relevance of
46 See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 161–62 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (con-
trasting consumer welfare concerns of antitrust with limited monopoly created by patent
laws); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 487 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (observing that per se rule against tying condemns them without inquiry into
consumer welfare); Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petrol. Co., 495 U.S. 328, 361 (1990) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (accusing majority of rejecting consumer welfare); Arizona v. Maricopa
Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 367 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing per se rule
against maximum price fixing contrary to consumer welfare).
47 Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 45 (1984) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).  In addition,
Justice Breyer used the term in one nonantitrust case, although he was referring to anti-
trust. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 539 (2013) (noting purpose of
antitrust policy is to maximize consumer welfare in a copyright exhaustion case).
48 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 14 (1997) (some uses of maximum resale price
maintenance can benefit consumers); Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S.
752, 769 (1984) (centralized management can benefit consumers); United States v. Phila.
Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 367–68 (1963) (anticompetitive mergers can reduce consumers’
alternatives); see also United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 624 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (accusing majority’s decision of being detrimental to consumers).
49 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
§§ 1, 6, 7, 9, 10 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-
08192010 [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES].
50 Lynn, supra note 31.
51 See Khan, supra note 30, at 733–34.
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these numbers is not apparent, other than their suggestion that firms are
currently too big.52
Clearly, high prices are not the target.  The movement’s proponents
denigrate the importance of prices to merger analysis—for example,
objecting to the fact that, while the 1968 Merger Guidelines were not particu-
larly focused on consumer prices, guidelines issued in the 1980s and after
were.  Indeed, low prices appear to be the enemy that antitrust must com-
bat.53  Movement protagonists argue in favor of resale price maintenance,
not in order to promote lower cost distribution, but rather to protect less
efficient retailers’ higher margins from predatory pricing—without any evi-
dence of a type of predatory pricing that resale price maintenance could
combat.54  They enthusiastically embrace Louis Brandeis’s repeated argu-
ments that “price-cutting” is in fact “the most potent weapon of monopoly—a
means of killing the small rival.”55  Much of the resale price maintenance
that Brandeis supported occurred at the behest of dealer cartels who forced
suppliers to use resale price maintenance as a way of disciplining price
cutters.56
Certainly, big business can cause harm to the lives of Americans in other
ways than through competitive pricing.  But these ways need to be articu-
lated, supported by evidence, and then sorted into those things that are con-
ceivably within the domain of antitrust and those that are not.  Promiscuous
application of the antitrust laws so as to make big firms smaller and prices
higher could cause irreparable harm, not only to consumers, but to the
entire economy.
Another point is critical to effective operation of the economy: When
considering efficiency, it is one thing to complain about loss of allocative
efficiency or market competitiveness.  It is quite another to complain about
productive efficiency, which often results from plain old engineering and
management.  A sensible antitrust policy toward practices such as vertical
integration must attempt to identify practices that raise prices by increasing
the opportunities for exercising market power, and distinguish them from
practices that reduce production or distribution costs.  Sledgehammer pro-
posals to go after concentration or vertical integration without regard to out-
put effects might in some cases bring prices closer to marginal costs, but
marginal costs would in most cases be higher.
52 See Lynn, supra note 31.
53 See id. (objecting that the word “price” appears far more frequently in the 1984
Guidelines than it did in the 1968 Guidelines).  The testimony writes about the 1984
Guidelines as if they were the current ones.
54 See Khan, supra note 30, at 723–24.
55 Lynn, supra note 31 (quoting Louis D. Brandeis, Competition that Kills, HARPER’S
WKLY., Nov. 15, 1913, https://louisville.edu/law/library/special-collections/the-louis-d.-
brandeis-collection/business-a-profession-chapter-15).
56 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836–1937, at 331,
341–48 (1991).
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In any event, the idea that Americans are unconcerned about low prices
cannot simply be asserted.  It needs to be tested.  Most obviously, it conflicts
with actual consumer behavior.  Within the vision of movement antitrust,
Amazon is a menace because it makes so many sales—and all of these to
consumers who apparently do not want low prices.  My own instinct is that if
a goal of supporting higher prices in order to benefit competing businesses
were communicated clearly, it would be a political disaster.  Small business
represents an important part of the economy, but everyone is a consumer.
Further, people in the lower two-thirds of the economic distribution are par-
ticularly sensitive to price.  So to the extent that it is Democrats who are sup-
porting this antitrust war on low prices, they are harming their own
constituencies.57  More objectively, embracing an ideology of supporting
lower output and higher prices would be a disaster for the American econ-
omy, which is in much fiercer competition with other world economies than
it was in the mid-twentieth century when Hofstadter, Bowman, and Bork were
writing.
The antitrust cognoscenti may not take movement antitrust arguments
seriously, regarding them as economically ill-informed, untested, excessively
rhetorical, incoherent, or paranoid.  But the cognoscenti control neither polit-
ical parties nor ballot boxes.  The danger that the political process will force
government policy off the rails is real.  It would hardly be the first time that a
political party pursued the ideology of an extremist minority at the expense
of its true constituency.
I. TECHNICAL ANTITRUST
Uncovering the many inconsistencies and weaknesses of movement anti-
trust is easy.  But technical antitrust has its own shortcomings.  “Technical
antitrust” refers to a set of antitrust rules that begin with a picture of some
best set of social circumstances reasonably achievable through the antitrust
laws.  Then it relies on evidence and experts to develop an approach that
tries to give effect to them, consistent with the substantial limitations of the
institutions that make antitrust policy.  The goals are coherent, although the
means of attaining them can be controversial.  For example, chief among
them in United States antitrust policy is some conception of efficiency (both
allocative and productive), procedural due process, and federalism.  In some
circumstances, efficiency and either due process or federalism trade against
each other.58  The consumer welfare principle is a prominent example of
technical antitrust, but so are more general welfare tests such as Bork’s pro-
posal that includes producer welfare, or others that might include aggregate
social welfare.
Both technical antitrust and movement antitrust suffer from weaknesses,
making each prone to sharp criticism from the other side.  Technical anti-
57 See Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle, supra note 1, (manuscript at
37).
58 See infra Section II.F.
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trust often appears to be underdeterrent because of its insistence on due
process and rationality, administrability and clear proof.59  By contrast, move-
ment antitrust often makes claims that are impossible to deliver, or adopts
speculative, unprovable theories about competitive harm.  As a result, move-
ment antitrust tends to be overdeterrent, certainly when tested by the goals
of low prices or economic efficiency.60  Technical antitrust typically sees opti-
mal policy as driven by the market, while movement antitrust is more respon-
sive to political concerns.  Technical antitrust is concerned about testability
of antitrust rules, although it must confront the fact that testing is sometimes
difficult.61  Movement antitrust appears to be unconcerned with testability.
The legitimate concerns of antitrust law must be driven by some concep-
tion of what citizens are entitled to expect from business and their economy.
Further, antitrust law is only one of many legal policies that address this con-
cern.  Antitrust law’s principal concern is with market power and not with
political power as such, although political power may become relevant when
it becomes a path to the creation of market power and in ways that antitrust
is competent to address.  This occurs mainly when politicians delegate the
control of governmental machinery to self-interested private parties.  Even
this overstates the case for antitrust control over political power.  The Consti-
tution as well as other institutions of government often serve to immunize
economically harmful political activity that might otherwise be actionable
under the antitrust laws.62  Most obviously, interest group capture represents
uses of political power to obtain outcomes that are economically harmful, in
the sense that they cause unjustified high prices or unreasonably limit com-
petitor access to markets.63
The consumer welfare principle has also been criticized for focusing
unnecessarily on the short run.64  That criticism is misplaced.  In fact, any
antitrust policy that is concerned with rational fact finding and due process
will find many long-run concerns to be unmanageable.  The history of preda-
59 E.g., Khan, supra note 30, at 710 (associating consumer welfare principle with exces-
sive focus on short-run concerns).
60 See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. (forthcom-
ing 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3058345.
61 See infra notes 277–79 and accompanying text.
62 For example, this is the effect of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, particularly when the
issue pertains to successful lobbying of legislative bodies. See E. R.R. Presidents Conference
v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 129, 135 (1961) (antitrust immunity for firms
that lobbied for an anticompetitive regulatory provision designed to benefit railroads and
harm truckers); see also 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶¶ 201–03 (4th ed. 2013).
63 Contrast the decision in North Carolina State Board Dental Examiners v. FTC, 135 S. Ct.
1101 (2015), which struck down state-sanctioned, privately enforced exclusionary conduct,
permitting only licensed dentists to whiten teeth, under the antitrust laws, and Sensational
Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2015), which immunized the same conduct,
when publicly enforced, from equal protection attack.  On the “state action” doctrine, see
infra notes 211–17 and accompanying text.
64 See Khan, supra note 30, at 710.
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tory pricing law illustrates the problem.  There is widespread agreement
among economists that welfare-reducing strategic pricing is possible in situa-
tions involving dominant firms.  In the long run these strategies lead to lower
output and higher prices than would prevail under more competitive condi-
tions.  Further, modeling some of these situations is not difficult.65
But the models are for the most part existence theorems.  An antitrust
court has the much more difficult task of examining practices and ruling out
harmless alternative explanations.66  Further it must be able to do this by
means of a rational, defensible process that gives firms notice of what they
can and cannot do, and then provides a defensible remedy.  For example, so-
called “limit” pricing is a strategy in which a dominant firm, typically in an
industry with high fixed costs, sets an above-cost price below its short-run
profit maximizing price but low enough to either exclude rivals or limit their
growth.67  An antitrust court assessing such a situation would have to deter-
mine the “correct” price, and perhaps order the firm to increase its already
profitable price even further in order to permit entry.
By contrast, the Areeda-Turner test for predatory pricing, which cur-
rently dominates in the federal courts, is limited to nonsustainable, short-run
strategies.  Its success among the courts owes to the fact that—notwithstand-
ing its own technical difficulties—it is much closer to being rationally
administrable than any of the long-run alternatives.68  The limitation is
65 See 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 736–37 (4th
ed. 2015) (summarizing long-run pricing strategies).
66 A good example is E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653 (1980).  The FTC
declined to proceed against an above-cost exclusionary pricing practice after a lengthy
investigation.  DuPont developed a very efficient mechanism for producing titanium diox-
ide which required a large scale.  It then allegedly built a much larger plant than needed to
meet market demand, simply to hold out its excess capacity as an entry deterrence device.
The Commission concluded that based on the facts presented it was impossible to distin-
guish this conduct from competitive behavior, concluding:
[T]he essence of the competitive process is to induce firms to become more effi-
cient and to pass the benefits of the efficiency along to consumers.  That process
would be ill-served by using antitrust to block hard, aggressive competition that is
solidly based on efficiencies and growth opportunities, even if monopoly is a pos-
sible result.
Id. at 750–51.  On the theory, see Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and
Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977).
67 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, ¶ 736.  For alternative models, see PAUL A.
GEROSKI, MARKET DYNAMICS AND ENTRY (1991); 1 RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, ECONOMICS AND
THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF U.S. AND E.U. ANTITRUST LAW 517–18 (2014);
Aaron S. Edlin, Predatory Pricing: Limiting Brooke Group to Monopolies and Sound Implementa-
tion of Price-Cost Comparisons, 127 YALE L.J.F. 996 (2018); Aaron S. Edlin, Essay, Stopping
Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941 (2002); Richard J. Gilbert, The Role of Potential
Competition in Industrial Organization, 3 J. ECON. PERSP., 107 (1989); Robert E. Hall, Potential
Competition, Limit Pricing, and Price Elevation from Exclusionary Conduct, in 1 AM. BAR. ASSOC.,
ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 433, 433–40 (2008).
68 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Areeda-Turner Test for Exclusionary Pricing: A Critical Jour-
nal, 46 REV. INDUS. ORG. 209, 220 (2015).
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decidedly not a function of the consumer welfare principle, however.  It is
driven entirely by fact-finding limitations on courts and the constitutional
requirement of rational decisionmaking supported by evidence.
Hofstadter’s observation that technical antitrust has largely become
invisible to the public remains apt.  The appeal of movement antitrust is that
it invokes images calculated to get the public more excited about antitrust.
At one level, of course, awareness is a good thing, but public awareness is not
the same thing as rational decisionmaking.  Antitrust is an excellent example
of why the American constitutional system is a republic and not a direct
democracy.  This entails two things.  First, the Constitution places limits on
how far the public can go in threatening property, contract, and liberty
rights, as well as the extent to which citizens are entitled to reasonable and
rational public decisionmaking.  Second, the principal role of citizen voters is
to elect governing officials, entrusting them to act wisely in the making and
administration of technical rules of law.  Ever since Alexander Hamilton’s
role as the new government’s financial manager, our constitutional republic
has relied on appointed experts to make decisions.  In our more complicated
society we use them more, but they are hardly an invention of the twenty-first
century or, for that matter, even the New Deal.
Has antitrust’s increasing pursuit of technical rules made the discipline
dull or, more importantly, irrelevant or ineffective?  Or is technique simply a
way for antitrust to make rational rules within its area of competence, leaving
other economic questions to different parts of government?  One clear con-
sequence of pursuing technical antitrust rules is that the range of problems
that antitrust is competent to address becomes narrower.69  Another is
underdeterrence.  Relevant underdeterrence is not the same thing as incor-
rect outcomes.  In a world where rules are imperfect and decision-making
institutions (such as jury trials) even more so, a certain number of incorrect
outcomes is to be expected.  But these outcomes should be more-or-less ran-
domized, producing a balance of false positives and false negatives.  By con-
trast, underdeterrence occurs when a substantive or procedural rule
systematically fails to recognize and remedy a particular type of harmful
practice.
The claim that technical antitrust is underdeterrent has some traction.
Because plaintiffs usually have the burden of proof and defendants are enti-
tled to due process, uncertainties are often resolved in favor of defendants.
When uncertainties loom large, as they often do in antitrust cases, this natu-
rally invites the critique that antitrust rules in complex areas produce too
many false negatives.  Here again, predatory pricing provides a good exam-
ple.  The two leading schools of technical antitrust—classic Chicago and the
Harvard school after 1975—take quite different approaches.70  The ortho-
dox Chicago school simply assumed that predatory pricing was so irrational
69 See infra notes 211–13 and accompanying text.
70 See infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
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that it should always be lawful.71  By contrast, the Harvard approach never
made such strong claims.  Rather, it assumed that the conditions and prac-
tices producing anticompetitive outcomes are uncommon and require clear
proof based on objective criteria.  The Supreme Court has nearly always fol-
lowed the Harvard approach.72  Nevertheless, results do not differ all that
much.  Under existing predatory pricing law, plaintiffs rarely win cases.
The same thing is a little less true for vertical practices, including vertical
mergers.  Historically, the Chicago school believed they should be virtually
per se legal, with a narrow exception for vertical practices that facilitate hori-
zontal collusion.73  The Harvard school, by contrast, believed that competi-
tive harm from purely vertical practices was uncommon but still possible, and
preferred subjecting them to the rule of reason.  Once again, the Supreme
Court has generally followed the Harvard approach.74  The antitrust agencies
continue to have an active vertical merger enforcement policy.75  Here the
story is a little different than for predatory pricing.  Defendants do occasion-
ally lose vertical cases, but not that many, and the proof requirements are
stringent.76  When they do lose them, lack of foreclosure rather than facilita-
tion of collusion is usually the reason, indicating that the Harvard school
dominates in this area.  In very sharp contrast, movement antitrust makes
expansive claims about these practices that are technically undisciplined,
untestable, and even incoherent.77  Movement antitrust claims are lodged,
variously, against absolute size, industrial concentration, high prices, lever-
age, and unspecified injury to small business.  Little in the way of adminis-
trable rules has thus far emerged—at least if one insists on a provable link
between a given practice and competitive injury.
Much of the discrepancy between movement antitrust and technical
antitrust results from the sparse language of the principal antitrust laws.  The
Sherman Act in particular speaks with expansive breadth about restraints on
trade or monopolization, without giving those terms any definition.  The
Clayton Act is a little more precise, addressing price discrimination,78 tying
71 E.g., BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 10, at 144–48; Frank H. Easterbrook,
Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 268 n.14 (1981).
72 See infra notes 90–96 and accompanying text.
73 See Section II.B.
74 See Section II.B.
75 See D. Bruce Hoffman, Acting Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n,
Remarks at Credit Suisse 2018 Washington Perspectives Conference: Vertical Merger
Enforcement at the FTC (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2018/01/
vertical-merger-enforcement-ftc (noting that antitrust agencies challenge between thirty
and forty horizontal mergers per year and about one vertical merger per year).
76 Examples of government victories include McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814 (11th
Cir. 2015); United States v. Dentsply International, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005); and
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See also ZF Meritor, LLC v.
Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012) (private plaintiff victory).
77 E.g., Khan, supra note 30, at 731–36 (discussing vertical integration).
78 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2012).
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and exclusive dealing,79 and mergers.80  But the relevant effects language,
“substantially to lessen competition” or “tend to create a monopoly,” is so
general that it can mean practically anything.81  Indeed, the same statutory
language was used in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, a merger case, to con-
demn the low prices that result from a merger,82 while today it reaches only
mergers that threaten higher prices.83  That opacity was very likely intended,
because the Clayton Act has a statutory dictionary which defines “antitrust
laws,” “commerce,” and “person,” but does not define “competition” or
“monopoly.”84  No wonder people peering into the antitrust laws come to
wildly different conclusions about what they can do.
The expansive, vague language of the antitrust laws also gives rise to the
feeling that the antitrust laws can do all things for all people, and over the
decades that is precisely how some constituencies have viewed them.  Move-
ment antitrust has always found this ambiguity attractive because it enables its
protagonists to pursue an agenda without having to go to a Congress that is
likely to be unsympathetic.  Attaining wealth equality, combatting structure
for its own sake, or strengthening the power of employees is far more effec-
tively done legislatively, but only if Congress is minded to act.85
II. TECHNICAL ANTITRUST: GOALS, SOURCES, AND LIMITATIONS
Technical antitrust today comes mainly from the Harvard and Chicago
schools, which started in different places but began to converge in the late
1960s and 1970s.86  Where the two schools have differed, the Supreme Court
has usually followed the Harvard approach.  As a result, the work of Bork,
Bowman, Posner, Easterbrook and other Chicago scholars needs to be placed
in perspective, although Posner was also a renegade who departed from Chi-
cago school orthodoxy more than the others.  In general, the Chicago school
proposals were more laissez faire than Harvard school approaches, calling for
less antitrust intervention.  Specific Chicago school recommendations gener-
ally obtained more traction in the academic literature than in the caselaw.
Speaking very generally, the policy changes that gave rise to current anti-
trust policy occurred mainly in the late 1970s and 1980s.  During that period,
antitrust became less interventionist and more responsive to then-current
79 Id. § 14.
80 Id. § 18.
81 Id. § 13(a).
82 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
83 See, e.g., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49.
84 15 U.S.C. § 12.
85 On this point, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy and Inequality of Wealth 1–2
(Univ. Pa. Inst. Law & Econ., Paper No. 17-26, 2017).
86 For good perspectives, see Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 933–36 (1979), who observes that the two positions have “since
overlapped, converged, or crossed over.” Id. at 925; see also William E. Kovacic, The Intellec-
tual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard
Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 74–75.
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economic theory.  The late 1970s witnessed the production of some remarka-
ble, highly influential books, including Posner’s original Antitrust Law: An
Economic Perspective (1976);87 Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox (1978);88 and the
first five volumes of Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner’s Antitrust Law trea-
tise (1978, 1980).89  From this period through 1990 the Supreme Court devi-
ated rightward from a path in which the government won nearly all of its
antitrust cases and private plaintiffs won many, to one that was far more
favorable to defendants.  The most important decisions on the merits that
reflect this shift are United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc. and United
States v. General Dynamics Corp. from 1974;90 Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises,
and Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. from 1977;91 J. Truett Payne Co.
v. Chrysler Motors Corp. from 1981,92 Associated General Contractors of California
v. California State Council of Carpenters,93 Copperweld Corp. v Independence Tube
Corp. and Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde from 1984;94 Cargill, Inc.
87 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976) [hereinafter
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW]. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001) purports to
be a second edition, but is so thoroughly revised that it is really a different book.
88 BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 10.
89 1–5 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1978–80).  For subse-
quent volumes, see PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW (22 vols., 3d
& 4th eds., 2010–2017).
90 United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974) (refusing to con-
demn conglomerate merger because of low entry barriers(citing PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTI-
TRUST ANALYSIS 517 (1967)); United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974)
(refusing to condemn horizontal/product extension merger); see also United States v.
Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974) (refusing to condemn merger).
91 Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (vertical nonprice
restraints must be analyzed under rule of reason (first citing Richard A. Posner, Antitrust
Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and
Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 299 (1975), and then citing Robert H.
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division II, YALE L.J.
373, 391–429 (1965))); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (denying indirect
purchasers a damages recovery); id. at 748 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (first citing RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 147–49 (1974), and
then citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 635 (2d ed. 1974)); U.S. Steel Corp. v.
Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (adding serious market power requirement to tying
cases); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (denying antitrust
standing to firm that was not victim of “antitrust injury”).
92 J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 561 (1981) (rejecting
Robinson-Patman “automatic damages” rule).
93 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 545–46 (1983) (denying standing to plaintiff who could not show relationship
between its injury and harm to competition); id. at 550 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing
2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 89).
94 Copperweld Corp. v Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984) (corporate parent
and wholly owned subsidiary lacked conspiratorial capacity); Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No.
2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (strengthening market power for tying, citing scholars includ-
ing Areeda, Areeda & Turner, and Posner), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works, Inc., v. Indep. Ink.
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v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc. and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., from 1986;95 and Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., from
1990.96
Aside from antitrust, however, the Supreme Court moved much more
generally rightward under the direction of three consecutive Republican
Chief Justices: Warren Burger, William Rehnquist, and John Roberts.97
While all three were conservative politically, none has ever expressed much
affinity for either the Chicago school or the Harvard school as such.  This fact
raises a question about the extent to which changes in antitrust direction
were really inspired by either of these antitrust schools; or did they simply
reflect a general change in the direction of political ideology?  Of course, the
two theories are not mutually exclusive.
Since the 1970s the term “Chicago school” has often served as a kind of
whipping boy for critics of any antitrust policy that is noninterventionist or
that favors defendants.98  On the other side, it has been credited by admirers
for what they see as antitrust’s greatest achievements.99
The Chicago school has had considerable influence on both antitrust
decisionmaking and scholarship.  Nevertheless, at the level of specific
rulemaking, the course pursued was most generally that proposed by the
Harvard school.  That remains true to this day.  Speaking generally, antitrust
has tended to take a moderate position between extremes, reflecting an insis-
tence that theories of both competitive harm and offsetting explanations be
Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); id. at 36 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing BORK, ANTITRUST
PARADOX, supra note 10, at 372–74).
95 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 119 & n.15, 121 & n.17 (1986)
(first citing Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Williamson on Predatory Pricing, 87 YALE L.J.
1337, 1348 (1978) [hereinafter Areeda & Turner, Williamson]; then citing BORK, ANTI-
TRUST PARADOX, supra note 10, at 144–59; and then citing Posner, supra note 86, at
939–40) (denying standing to competitor alleging aggressive pricing as a consequence of
merger); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589, 598 (1986)
(first citing Easterbrook, supra note 71, at 268; then citing BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX,
supra note 10, at 149–55; and then citing Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory
Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 698
(1975) [hereinafter Areeda & Turner, Predatory]) (greatly expanding criteria for summary
judgment in case involving claims of agreement and predatory pricing).
96 Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petrol. Co., 495 U.S. 328, 339–43, 343 n.13 (1990) (first
citing Areeda & Turner, Predatory, supra note 95, at 697–99; then citing Robert H. Bork,
The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE L.J.
373, 464 (1966); and then citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L.
REV. 886, 887–90 (1981)) (holding plaintiff injured by competitor’s maximum resale price
maintenance did not suffer antitrust injury).
97 There were actually four consecutive Republican Chief Justices.  Earl Warren was
also a Republican appointee (he was the Republican Governor of California and an Eisen-
hower appointee) but the most liberal Chief Justice in American history.
98 E.g., HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008).
99 See Alan J. Meese, Justice Scalia and Sherman Act Textualism, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2013 (2017) (attributing many of the developments discussed here to the Chicago school,
and partly to Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the Sherman Act).
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well developed, and that fact findings be both sufficient and justified.  Today,
both movement antitrust on the left and the reactionary leftovers of the Chi-
cago school on the right reach the strong conclusions that they do by giving
short shrift to these concerns.
To an extent, Bork himself was cut from the same cloth as the propo-
nents of movement antitrust today: many of his views were more extreme
than the literature, and he denigrated economic inquiry as often as he sup-
ported it.  For example, just as movement antitrust tends to assume competi-
tive harm without good evidence, Bork tended to assume that efficiencies
explained most restrictive practices.100  Further, he rejected any idea that
they should be individually proved.  Courts would get it wrong because they
would overlook evidence of efficiencies rather than evidence of competitive
harm.101  The Harvard school’s approach to the rule of reason has the advan-
tage that it takes evidence of both harm and offsetting justifications more
seriously.  It has the disadvantage that the rule of reason has become unduly
cumbersome and costly to litigate.102
What follows is a brief summary of the most important developments in
antitrust doctrine since the 1970s.
A. Predatory Pricing and Other Single-Firm Exclusionary Practices
In the law of exclusionary (predatory) pricing, the traditional Chicago
school view was that the practice was irrational and was so rare that the best
rule should be per se legality.103  Then-Professor Posner’s position was not as
extreme.  He concluded that predatory pricing was not common, but that it
“cannot be dismissed as inevitably an irrational practice.”104  The Harvard
school position, which Areeda and Turner first articulated in 1975, was clos-
est to Posner’s, although their test for it was different.105  They concluded
that predatory pricing was a rational act only in the presence of a probability
of recoupment,106 and that the proper price standard for evaluating it was
100 See Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle, supra note 1.
101 See, e.g., supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text (discussing Bork and futility of
trying to measure efficiencies); see infra notes 182–84 and accompanying text (discussing
Bork and oligopoly).
102 See Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, supra note 35.
103 E.g., BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 10, at 144–48; Easterbrook, supra at 71;
John S. McGee, Predatory Price-Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137
(1958).
104 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 87, at 186.
105 For Posner’s test in 1976, see id. at 188–89 (proof of predatory pricing requires
either (1) a price below short-run marginal cost; or (2) a price below long-run marginal
cost with intent to exclude a competitor).
106 Areeda & Turner, supra note 95, at 698 (“[P]redation in any meaningful sense can-
not exist unless there is a temporary sacrifice of net revenues in the expectation of greater
future gains.  Indeed, the classically-feared case of predation has been the deliberate sacri-
fice of present revenues for the purpose of driving rivals out of the market and then
recouping the losses through higher profits earned in the absence of competition.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-2\NDL203.txt unknown Seq: 20 17-DEC-18 12:47
602 notre dame law review [vol. 94:2
either short-run marginal cost or average variable cost.107  The Supreme
Court and lower courts have largely followed the Areeda-Turner formula-
tion.108  Testing in this area has proven to be extremely difficult.  Among the
more tested propositions in the economic literature—and an area where the
Supreme Court failed—was the relationship between oligopoly and discipli-
nary pricing that was the subject of the Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp. litigation.109  Given a long history of lockstep oligopoly
pricing in the cigarette industry in question, and that the defendant’s prices
fell below average variable cost during the competitive period,110 the cost of
a false positive would have been very low in comparison with the policy cost
of a false negative.  When combined with an “agreement” requirement that
makes coordinated action very difficult to prosecute except in cases of
explicit interseller communication,111 antitrust policy has been left toothless
against coordinated interaction, with only merger policy available to keep
bad situations from becoming worse.112
B. Vertical Intrabrand and Interbrand Restraints; Foreclosure
The Chicago school position on vertical intrabrand restraints113 was that
they were virtually never anticompetitive and the best rule for addressing
them was per se legality.  Bork concluded that “[a]nalysis shows that every
vertical restraint should be completely lawful.”114  Posner, who was typically
more moderate, largely agreed.115  The Harvard school position was that
anticompetitive outcomes were infrequent but possible, and that vertical
restraints should be addressed under the rule of reason, requiring case-by-
case evaluation of power and anticompetitive effects.  Speaking about both
nonprice restraints and minimum and maximum resale price maintenance,
107 Id. at 716.
108 See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312
(2007); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).  On
the lower courts, see 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, ¶¶ 725–42; Hovenkamp,
supra note 68.
109 Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 212.
110 Id. at 213–17.
111 See 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 1428–36 (4th
ed. 2016).
112 See infra Sections II.D–E; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Prophylactic Merger Policy, 69
HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3090650 (discussing use of merger policy to reach coordinated interaction that antitrust
is otherwise unable to reach).
113 Vertical intrabrand restraints limit distribution of the supplier’s own brand.  These
include resale price maintenance and nonprice restraints such as location clauses or terri-
tory assignments.
114 BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 10, at 288.
115 Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per
Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 24 (1981).
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the Supreme Court adopted the Harvard school position.  The changes
occurred over a period of thirty years.116
The story on interbrand restraints, which include exclusive dealing and
tying, is much the same.  Bork concluded that “there is every reason to
believe that exclusive dealing and requirements contracts have no purpose or
effect other than the creation of efficiency.”117  He criticized Phillip Areeda
for arguing that exclusive dealing might cause anticompetitive foreclosure in
some situations.  This was consistent with his own belief that foreclosure theo-
ries of antitrust liability—namely, that a firm could use an exclusive contract
or other practice to keep rivals out of the market—were bogus.118  In a
lengthy discussion he analyzed many forms of tying and the rationales
offered for them—including leverage, evasion of regulation, price discrimi-
nation, metering, cost savings, and protection of good will.  He concluded
that “[i]n our present state of knowledge, this means the law would accept
the legality of all tying arrangements.”119
Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox was an “old economy” book, however, taking
very little notice of intellectual property rights, networks and other recent
technologies that have produced a great deal of tying litigation.120  Posner
was a little more constrained than Bork on exclusive dealing, finding it an
“unlikely” strategy, but not one that could be ruled out altogether.121  On
tying, he was also more qualified than Bork, finding possible grounds for
condemning ties used for price discrimination.122
The Harvard position on tying has evolved and is more complex.  First,
the old Harvard structuralist position twenty years prior to the publication of
the Antitrust Law treatise was Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner’s argument in
1959 that tying should be illegal per se, although they believed that exclusive
dealing should be subject to the rule of reason.123  The Antitrust Law treatise
did not get to tying and exclusive dealing until 1995–96, after Turner was
gone and around the time of Areeda’s death.124  In 1976, however, Areeda
116 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (holding
vertical nonprice restraints must be analyzed under rule of reason and resale price mainte-
nance); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (same); see also State Oil
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (same with maximum resale price maintenance).
117 BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 10, at 309.
118 Id. at 304 (quoting and critiquing AREEDA, supra note 91).  For Bork’s rejection of
foreclosure, see infra note 162 and accompanying text.
119 BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 10, at 380.
120 See Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 102–03.
121 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 87, at 205.
122 Id. at 171–79.
123 See CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 157–60 (1959) (discussing per se rule for tying and rule of reason for exclusive
dealing).
124 The relevant volumes are nine through eleven. See 9–11 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HER-
BERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW (4th ed. forthcoming 2018).  The first editions were pub-
lished in 1995 and 1996.  Volumes nine and ten address tying; eleven addresses exclusive
dealing.  Turner died in 1994 and Areeda in 1995.
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wrote an article arguing that most tying injuries were inherently offset.  That
is, a seller could obtain a higher price for one of the products only by a
corresponding reduction in the price of the other product.  As a result, he
argued, buyers upon whom tying was imposed should not have a damages
action.125  This argument is a qualified embrace of the Chicago school rejec-
tion of the leverage theory insofar as overcharges are concerned: since there
is a single maximizing monopoly price, a price increase in one tied-up prod-
uct requires a compensating reduction in the other one.126  Areeda also
found no competitive harm from price discrimination ties.127  Both of these
were “extraction” arguments, however, aimed at the view that tying enabled
the leveraging of higher prices.  They did not qualify the traditional Harvard
school acceptance of foreclosure of rivals or new entrants as an antitrust con-
cern.  In 1986, Areeda published a lecture categorically arguing in favor of a
rule of reason for tying.128  That position remains reflected in the Antitrust
Law treatise, which generally argues for presumptive legality, but condemna-
tion if market power and anticompetitive harm are proven under clearly
articulated theories.129  The treatise also continues to accept foreclosure as a
relevant concern, and the caselaw generally does as well.130
The Supreme Court has addressed tying in three substantive decisions
since 1980.  In dicta in the 1984 Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde
decision it suggested that precedent required adherence to a per se rule con-
demning it.131  Nevertheless, the Court conducted a lengthy rule-of-reason-
like treatment and then approved the tie for lack of sufficient market
share.132  In the hotly disputed Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,
Inc. decision it found sufficient tying product market power based on a “lock
in” theory, a query that would have been unnecessary if ties were legal per
se.133  Further, the action was brought by competitors, who argued that they
were foreclosed from the market for maintaining Kodak photocopiers.  Jus-
tice Scalia’s dissent objected to the power finding, and in the process
observed that the Court was proceeding under a per se theory.  Further, the
125 Phillip Areeda, Comment, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1127, 1137 nn.50–51 (1976).
126 The argument was developed principally in Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements
and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 21 (1957).  However, Areeda did not cite Bowman.
127 Areeda, supra note 125, at 1137 nn.49–51.
128 See Phillip Areeda, The Rule of Reason—A Catechism on Competition, 55 ANTITRUST L.J.
571, 587 (1986).
129 See 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 124, ¶ 1729 (briefly summarizing the
theories).
130 Id. ¶¶ 1708–09.
131 Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984) (“It is far too late in
the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying
arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unrea-
sonable ‘per se.’”), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
132 See also U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) (signaling
change to a more serious market power requirement).
133 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
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majority expressly embraced a foreclosure theory, and Justice Scalia did not
appear to reject it.134  Finally, in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,
the Court held that tying power could not be inferred from a patent, but it
did not overrule tying law’s idiosyncratic per se rule that requires proof of
tying product power and never suggested that all ties should be legal.135
Foreclosure was not in prospect in Illinois Tool Works because the tied prod-
uct, ordinary printing ink, was available from many sources.  In its 2001
United States v. Microsoft Corp. decision, the D.C. Circuit assumed that tying
arrangements generally would be governed by a per se rule if the market
power requirements were met, but then it created a rule of reason exception
for software operating system platform ties.136
To summarize, the courts have not come close to reaching the Bork
position that tying should be legal per se.  They have begun chipping away at
the per se rule, and its demise seems all but inevitable.  But in that case tying
arrangements will be placed under the rule of reason, with foreclosure surviv-
ing as a central concern.  This is essentially the Harvard position.
While the Supreme Court has not addressed exclusive dealing in this
time period, the lower courts have consistently adhered to the Harvard
school formulation, which is that exclusive dealing contracts are competi-
tively harmless most of the time but can sometimes cause competitive harm
when they foreclose competitors unreasonably.  They are thus addressed
under the rule of reason’s burden-shifting framework.  Plaintiffs continue to
win some important cases—all on foreclosure rationales—even in the twenty-
first century.137  In its 2018 decision in Ohio v. American Express Co., which
involved a vertical interbrand restraint, all nine Justices agreed that the rule
of reason should apply.138  However, the Court’s analysis cannot be
described as either Chicago school or Harvard school.139
One important development is the increasing use of section 2 of the
Sherman Act in exclusive dealing cases.  Section 2 has a higher market power
requirement but is less categorical about other requirements than section 3
of the Clayton Act and can reach conduct for which the “agreement” require-
ment has not been met.140  This has contributed to a law of quasi-exclusive
dealing, covering various discounting practices that do not meet the ortho-
134 Id. at 478, 482; id. at 486–87, 490 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135 Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 43 n.4, 46 (2006).
136 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89–91 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
137 E.g., McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Dentsply
Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005).  The court in McWane made clear that the rule of
reason applied to exclusive dealing agreements, with its usual burden-shifting approach.
McWane, 783 F.3d at 833; accord Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 70–71 (applying rule of reason
burden shifting and condemning exclusive dealing).
138 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018).
139 Id.; see Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3219396.
140 E.g., Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 184 (applying section 2 of the Sherman Act); see 3B
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, ¶ 768; 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 124,
¶ 1800.
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dox definition of an agreement not to deal with one’s rivals but can still serve
anticompetitive purposes.141
Other practices raise similar concerns.  For example, Google, a company
that competes in online travel agency (OTA) markets, requires other OTAs
to provide proprietary information about things such as room availability or
special discounts.142  This practice may operate as a form of quasi-exclusive
dealing to the extent that it hinders rival OTA’s ability to compete.  Offset-
ting this, of course, is the fact that, while Google’s share of search is high, it is
only one of many general search engines, and competing OTAs such as
Orbitz and Expedia operate their own successful specialty search engines that
cover both air transport and lodging.  So one important question is whether
Google has the power to produce anticompetitive results when consumers
have readily available alternatives and switching is virtually costless.143
The American Express case mentioned above also involved an interbrand
restraint.144  The government used section 1 of the Sherman Act to chal-
lenge American Express’s merchant “antisteering” rules.  These forbid retail-
ers who accept the American Express card, which is particularly expensive for
merchants, from offering product-price discounts to customers for using less
expensive cards.  The antisteering rules served to insulate card users from
American Express’s higher merchant fees by making them indifferent to
alternatives that may be less costly.  Agreeing with the Second Circuit, the
Supreme Court held that in a two-sided transaction market, the traditional
rule defining markets in terms of reasonable interchangeability must be dis-
carded.  Rather, it held, in such a market, losses on one side (merchant
acceptance fees) would be offset by gains on the other side (cardholder use).
As a result, the market definition must look at both sides of the market and
the plaintiff would have to show net harm.145
What this curious approach to market definition prevented the Court
from seeing is that the antisteering rule actually produced losses on both
sides.146  A cardholder prevented from switching by the antisteering rule
would indeed be increasing usage on American Express’s merchant side.  But
this happened only because the customer was denied the opportunity to
employ its first choice of a card, and thus it was in fact worse off.  The
merchant was also worse off because it was denied the benefit of the bargain
with the cardholder for use of a cheaper card.  And, of course, competitors
offering cheaper cards were also injured.  The only offset was increased reve-
141 E.g., ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 278 (3d Cir. 2012) (condemn-
ing above-cost discounting program, analogizing it to exclusive dealing).  Other decisions
are discussed in 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 124, ¶ 1807.
142 See Google-Hotel Travelopoly, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/arti
cles/google-hotel-travelopoly-1514419414.
143 Arguing for the possibility is Tim Wu. See Tim Wu, Blind Spot: The Attention Economy
and the Law, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2941094/.
144 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2290 (2018).
145 Id. at 2294–95.
146 The argument here is taken from Erik Hovenkamp, supra note 139, at 37.
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nue to the American Express platform itself—not to either the merchant side
or the cardholder side.147  Further, this gain in a transaction on the Ameri-
can Express side was precisely offset by a loss of that transaction to a compet-
ing network such as Visa or MasterCard.
The correct way to assess the restraint would have been to define a mar-
ket in which cardholder injury occurred in the proper way, including only
substitutes.  At that point the burden should shift to the defendant to prove
any offsetting benefits on the other side of the market or elsewhere.148  Mar-
kets are always properly limited to reasonably close substitutes and there is no
reason to deviate from that principle in this case.149  The two types of trans-
actions that the Court grouped into the same market were actually comple-
ments in production.150  In general, the price of complements in a market
move in opposite directions.  For example, as the price of gasoline increases,
making driving costlier, people will consume fewer automobiles.  This rela-
tionship is an important part of the market mechanism for attaining a com-
petitive equilibrium.  The antisteering rule prevented this from occurring, as
customers received no incentive to switch to a less costly card.  With the antis-
teering rule abolished, customers would stay with American Express’s higher
cost card only if they valued the perks they received from it by a greater
amount than the discount the merchant offered them.
When used properly, the rule of reason is a safe spot for antitrust to be
in when current theory is not as robust as it should be.  It allows for litigation
resources to be invested in the correct set of questions, which concerns
power and anticompetitive effects.  The Supreme Court’s ill-conceived per se
rule against ties developed at a time when very little was known about them,
and the courts had a clearly exaggerated impression of potential harms.151
But the Bork conclusion that they should all be legal was equally premature.
By the same token, the Court’s ill-conceived misdefinition of the market in
American Express was based on its failure to understand the fundamental eco-
nomics of the situation it was addressing.
C. Vertical Mergers and Foreclosure
Bork’s view of vertical mergers was largely dictated by his position on
vertical contractual restraints.  First, he would never condemn a purely verti-
cal merger on foreclosure grounds—essentially the same position he took for
tying and exclusive dealing.  Rather, “[p]roperly drawn and applied horizon-
147 See id. at 37.
148 See id. at 38.
149 See 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, ¶ 565.
150 Complements in use, such as gasoline and automobiles, are used together.  By con-
trast, complements in production, such as beef and cowhide, are produced together.  The
Court’s opinion correctly concluded that the two products were not complements in use,
but failed to see that they were complements in production. See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct.
at 2286 n.8.
151 See 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 124, ¶ 1720.
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tal rules are all that we need.”152  He generally followed Ronald Coase’s argu-
ment that a vertical merger “is merely an instance of replacing a market
transaction with administrative direction because the latter is believed to be a
more efficient method of coordination.”153  He briefly considered and
rejected Areeda’s suggestion that a vertical merger might create a second-
level monopoly, which would be more resistant to competitive entry and also
less likely to innovate,154 or that the merger might facilitate a price squeeze,
injuring rival firms who are not vertically integrated.155  Areeda did not
exactly say that these practices should be unlawful, but only that “the law
should [not] be indifferent to monopoly at the second level.”156
Neither the Supreme Court nor any circuit has addressed a vertical
merger case since 1979.  In that year the Second Circuit declined to con-
demn a merger based on a theory that both Bork and Areeda rejected—
namely, that a postmerger firm might favor its own subsidiary over rivals in
times of short supply.157  Vertical merger law in the enforcement agencies
has hardly been robust, although they have obtained several consent decrees
and some transactions were abandoned in the face of government scru-
tiny.158  While the Horizontal Merger Guidelines have been continuously
revised through 2010, the Vertical Merger Guidelines have not been touched
since 1984.  Even those Guidelines, however, were willing to condemn verti-
cal mergers on theories that Bork rejected.  One was a foreclosure theory
Areeda proposed that the merger would raise entry barriers by requiring two-
level entry.159  The 1984 Guidelines also recognized a problem with mergers
that involved the acquisition of a disruptive buyer in the downstream market
that had been able to undermine collusion in the upstream market,160 and
also evasion of rate regulation.161
152 BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 10, at 245.
153 Id. at 227.
154 Id. at 239 (citing AREEDA, supra note 91, 675–76).
155 Id. at 243.
156 AREEDA, supra note 91, at 675.
157 See Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 354–55 (2d Cir. 1979) (rejecting argument
that firm would discriminate in favor of its own subsidiaries in times of short supply); see
also 4 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 89, ¶ 1003 (also rejecting this argument).  On permis-
sible rationales for condemning vertical mergers, see Hovenkamp, supra note 112.
158 For an exhaustive summary through July 2018, see Steven C. Salop & Daniel P.
Culley, Vertical Merger Enforcement Actions: 1994–July 2018 (Aug. 23, 2018) (unpub-
lished appendix), http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=2541&context=facpub.  This document is an online appendix to Steven C. Salop & Daniel
P. Culley, Revising the US Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues and an Interim Guide for Practi-
tioners, 4 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1 (2015); see also Hoffman, supra note 75.
159 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
§ 4.21 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Guidelines]; cf. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 10,
at 240–42.
160 1984 Guidelines, supra note 159, § 4.222.
161 Id. § 4.23.
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Bork categorically rejected foreclosure theories for condemning vertical
mergers.162  In the first edition of Antitrust Law, published in 1980, Areeda
and Turner accepted it, although with severe qualifications.163  Concerns
analogous to foreclosure have reentered the picture, however.164  At least
part of the reason is technology changes, or in some cases changes in the
regulatory environment, that make foreclosure an increasing concern.
These are particularly apt when the property being transferred between the
upstream and downstream firm is a nonrivalrous good capable of being used
an indefinite number of times.165  In traditional markets for hard goods, pro-
ducers have a finite capacity which must be allocated, and they would under-
standably allocate them to their own subsidiaries rather than independent
firms.  For example, a truck wheel manufacturer that is acquired by a truck
manufacturer has the capacity to make only a finite number of wheels.166  If
it transferred its full capacity of wheels to its own parent, then other truck
manufacturers would be foreclosed from access to these.  In the case of a
market-dominant wheel company and high entry barriers, that might leave
rivals without good alternatives.  Nevertheless, it is hard to find a good eco-
nomic rationale for forcing a firm to share its output with rivals when its own
subsidiaries require all of it.  Intrafirm transfers of goods are a primary rea-
son that firms integrate vertically, taking advantage of situations where the
costs of such transfer are less than the costs of using the market.
But suppose that the asset in question is Wonder Woman, a digitized
Hollywood film that is capable of being reproduced an unlimited number of
times. Wonder Woman is owned by Time Warner, whose recent acquisition by
AT&T, an internet service provider, was unsuccessfully challenged by the gov-
ernment.167  The concern is that vertically integrated AT&T, which also owns
DirecTV, might now refuse to license Wonder Woman to rival programmers.
Now the “capacity” argument no longer obtains: AT&T will never license so
many performances of Wonder Woman through its own internet and cable
subscribers that Wonder Woman is all used up.  So if it denies rival cable or
internet service companies access to Wonder Woman, there must be another
reason.168  At least some of these can involve foreclosure.
162 BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 10, at 231–37.
163 4 AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 89, ¶ 1004e (accepting foreclosure
theories “although the conditions necessary for such harm are stringent”).
164 See Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1962, 1963
(2018); Steven C. Salop, The AT&T/Time Warner Merger: Judge Leon Garbled Professor Nash, 6
J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3247845.
165 See Hovenkamp, supra, note 112, at 15.
166 See Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 352–61 (2d Cir. 1979).  The court found
the foreclosure percentages at issue—less than six percent—were insufficient. Id.
167 See United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 253 (D.D.C. 2018).  The court
did not deny the government’s theories of harm but found them unsupported by the facts.
Id.
168 See Complaint ¶¶ 5–6, AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (No. 17-cv-02511); see also
Hovenkamp, supra note 112, at 15, 18–19.
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A merger is usually challenged prior to its occurrence.  As a result, there
is no proof that competitive harm has occurred, but rather a fear that it
might occur.  Why would postmerger AT&T/Time Warner deny Wonder
Woman to subscribers of rival internet broadband or cable providers? Wonder
Woman has already been made, can be licensed at very low cost, and is likely
to claim high royalties, making short run profits very high.  The vertical
acquisition might make refusal to license Wonder Woman to outsiders physi-
cally possible, but that does not necessarily make it a profitable strategy.
The fear would come from one of several things.  First, AT&T might
deny Wonder Woman or other assets to rival carriers in order to induce cus-
tomers to switch to DirecTV or an AT&T cable subsidiary.  Second, it might
license Wonder Woman to competitors only at a higher price than it builds in
for its own subscribers, and higher than the premerger price.  Third,
under–vertically integrated oligopoly firms might restrict their programs to
their own subsidiaries, creating several vertically integrated silos and limiting
the range of programs available to individual subscribers.
Ordinarily a firm can charge any price it pleases as far as the antitrust
laws are concerned, and price discrimination of this kind is not unlawful.
Nor does a firm ordinarily have a duty to share its products with rivals.  But
these are not the issues in a merger case, where the fear is that the merger
will facilitate a higher price or lower output or product diversity than
obtained prior to the merger.  If that is likely, then the merger is unlawful
under the Clayton Act’s incipiency standard, which condemns mergers that
realistically threaten to lessen competition.169  Nevertheless, at least one of
these harms must be substantially likely to occur.  The risk should be assessed
by employing objective tests designed to predict the postmerger firm’s profit-
maximizing course of conduct.  In dismissing the complaint, however, the
district court credited the testimony of employees of the defendant that they
would not act so as to maximize the profits of the postmerger firm, but only
of the program licensing division.170  That in effect would require the firm to
act irrationally.  It would also return antitrust policy back to pre-Copperweld
days when antitrust courts entertained the notion that a firm’s separate sub-
sidiaries or other divisions should be treated as distinct profit-maximizing
entities for antitrust purposes.171
D. Ancillary Horizontal Restraints and the Rule of Reason
Richard Posner’s brief mention of the rule of reason in his 1976 book
was unilluminating and even disparaging, suggesting a belief that litigation
under a rule of reason would be unwieldy.172  History may yet prove him
169 See Hovenkamp, supra note 112, at 1 & n.1.
170 AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 223.
171 Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 758–59 (1984) (overruling
previous decisions and holding that a parent firm and its subsidiaries are a single entity for
antitrust purposes).  For more information on Copperweld, see 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HER-
BERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 1462–63 (4th ed. 2017).
172 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 87, at 213.
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correct.  Two years later, Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox included a highly influ-
ential taxonomy of “naked” and “ancillary” restraints that Bork took from
Circuit Judge Taft’s United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. decision173 as well
as Bork’s own previous writings.174  He argued that a rule of reason requiring
proof of power and anticompetitive effects was necessary if a restraint was
determined to be reasonably ancillary to legitimate joint activity.  He did not
develop the modern conception of a prima facie case and subsequent shift in
the burden of proof, which have become central features of modern rule of
reason analysis.  Three years later Areeda laid out some of the basic contours
of the modern rule of reason in an essay for the Federal Judicial Center,
discussing both the burden-shifting framework that we now use, as well as the
relevance of less restrictive alternatives.175
In a sense, the rule of reason was a joint enterprise of the Chicago and
Harvard schools.  Bork’s scholarship developed the argument for the rule’s
domain by arguing for fewer applications of the per se rule.  Subsequent
Harvard school scholarship fashioned the rule of reason’s modern, burden-
shifting methodology of proof.
E. Market Structure, Barriers to Entry, and Horizontal Merger Policy
Beginning with the Cellar-Kefauver Amendments to the merger statute
in 1950,176 modern merger policy was born during the high point of “struc-
turalism” in antitrust law.177  One attribute of structuralism was the structure-
conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, largely developed by Harvard econo-
mists in the 1930s through the 1950s, under which structure determined con-
duct and conduct determined the extent of noncompetitive performance.
Under the logic of the SCP paradigm, if S entails C and C entails P, then C
drops out as a variable of interest.  We can infer noncompetitive perform-
ance directly from structure.178  Following this logic, the Supreme Court’s
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank merger decision held that when the
173 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S.
211 (1899); see also BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 10, at 26–30.
174 Most importantly, see Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price
Fixing and Market Division (pts. 1 & 2), 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965), 75 YALE L.J.373 (1966).
175 PHILLIP AREEDA, THE “RULE OF REASON” IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (1981).  On the cur-
rent state of the rule of reason for ancillary restraints, including the sequence of prima
facie case, burden shifting to the defendant to show defenses, and the search for less
restrictive alternatives, see 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 171, ch. 15; and
Hovenkamp, Rule of Reason, supra note 35.
176 Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (2012)).
177 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT, 1870–1970, at 211–19 (2015).
178 Id. at 214; see EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPE-
TITION 46–51 (8th ed. 1962); Edward S. Mason, Price and Production Policies of Large-Scale
Enterprise, 29 AM. ECON. REV. 61 (1939); see also JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
(1959).  Bain received his Ph.D. at Harvard but spent most of his career at U.C. Berkeley.
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structure of the market and the market shares of the merging firms attained
a given minimum, the merger should be illegal.179
Structuralism became the bullseye in Chicago school targeting of
Harvard school industrial organization theory.180  The attack on it was the
topic of a legendary symposium at Airlie House, Virginia, in 1974, and pro-
duced an influential text on the subject.181  In its most extreme form, this
antistructuralism virtually denied the existence of oligopoly or any other
problematic form of market structure other than single-firm monopoly or
express collusion.  That is, unless they colluded, even the firms in a two or
three firm market could be expected to behave competitively.
Bork took essentially that position.  In The Antitrust Paradox he argued
that, while mergers to monopoly should be unlawful because they eliminated
all competition, mergers that left at least two competitors should be tolerated
at least up to the point that the postmerger firm had sixty percent to seventy
percent of the market.182  This conclusion was driven in part by Bork’s seri-
ous doubts that oligopoly behavior existed except in economics textbooks.183
As a result, the principal fear of merger policy was price fixing, and that was
independently unlawful.  However, “as a tactical concession to current oli-
gopoly phobia,” Bork thought that mergers should be permitted if they
would leave three “significant” companies in the market.184
Posner was more willing to accept oligopoly as a problem, but in light of
their efficiency potential he also believed that the merger standards of the
day were much too severe.  He saw little need for antitrust intervention in
cases where the four largest firms made up less than sixty percent of the
market.185  He also believed that inferences of harm could not be drawn
from market shares alone, but depended on other factors showing the pro-
pensity of the market toward collusion.186
Areeda and Turner’s original discussion, in 1980, of horizontal mergers
was quite far from the Chicago position, largely accepting the then-dominant
literature on oligopoly pricing.  They identified as “presumptively unlawful”
any merger where the aggregate market share of the merging firms exceeded
179 United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
180 See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Introduction to the Neal Report and the Crisis in Antitrust, 5
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Spring 2009, at 217, https://www.competitionpolicyinternation
al.com/assets/0d358061e11f2708ad9d62634c6c40ad/Hovenkamp.pdf (providing a subse-
quent history through the 1970s); see also G.C. Archibald, Chamberlin Versus Chicago, 29 REV.
ECON. STUD. 2 (1961).
181 INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds.,
1974). But see MARK J. GREEN ET AL., THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM: RALPH NADER’S STUDY
GROUP REPORT ON ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT (1972) (attacking antitrust enforcement for
not pursuing industrial concentration).
182 BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 10, at 221.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 221–22.
185 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 87, at 112.
186 Id. at 111–12.
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ten percent, unless the acquired firm was very small.187  Areeda and Turner
then qualified these observations by stating that, when efficiencies are taken
into account, a threshold in the range of thirteen percent or fourteen per-
cent might be more sensible.188  These standards were significantly more tol-
erant than the then-existing caselaw reflected in such decisions as Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States189 and United States v. Von’s Grocery Co.,190 but significantly
less tolerant than Bork’s proposal, and somewhat closer to Posner’s.  Subse-
quent caselaw softened, but never came close to eliminating, the structural
presumption.  Rather, structure became a central factor among many that
the courts must consider when evaluating a merger.191  The views of Posner,
Areeda, and Turner are more or less consistent with those adopted in the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 1982 and subsequent revisions.192
In subsequent years, merger standards were more fully articulated and
periodically revised in successive editions of the Merger Guidelines.  While
the Supreme Court largely abandoned the field of mergers, lower court deci-
sions have tended to follow the Guidelines.  Those standards became more
tolerant of mergers than Areeda and Turner originally proposed.193  Neither
the Guidelines nor the caselaw has ever come close to Bork’s position that
structure is unimportant until it reaches monopoly.194  Further, today a grow-
ing consensus believes that merger law has become excessively tolerant, per-
mitting too many mergers that harm consumer welfare by increasing
prices.195  This scholarship reflects a consensus that concentration does
count, although not in the absolute way that the proponents of the SCP para-
digm once imagined.  Today market structure forms the principal content of
a prima facie case against a horizontal merger, which can then be rebutted by
various types of nonstructural evidence.196  The dominant question is
187 4 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 89, ¶ 915.
188 Id.
189 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
190 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
191 See Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, and
Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996, 2008–17 (2018).
192 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49 (providing the current version).
193 Subsequent editions of Antitrust Law reflected the changes.  The current version is 4
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 111, ¶ 932.
194 The decision that has come closest is United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981,
982–85 (D.C. Cir. 1990), which disparaged the use of statistical evidence of market concen-
tration.  For a critique, see Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note 191.  One important quali-
fier is that overall market structure is unimportant in unilateral effects cases, which
consider elimination of competition between closely competing companies in a product
differentiated market.  On unilateral effects, see 4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 111,
¶ 914.
195 See JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES 9–37 (2015); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Efficiencies, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 703, 705 (2017) (summa-
rizing argument and studies).
196 On the current framework, see Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note 191, at 2010–11.
On the types of nonstructural evidence that is relevant, see 4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 111, ¶¶ 940–55.
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whether the merger is likely to raise price or reduce output in some relevant
market.  Both the changing standards and the subsequent evaluation indi-
cates the extent to which antitrust merger analysis closely tracks prevailing
theory and economic factfinding.  This evidence continues to find strong and
worrisome correlations between market structure and price-cost margins.197
The Harvard school, and with somewhat more quibbling, the Chicago
school except for Bork, both acknowledged that analysis of entry barriers had
a role to play in merger enforcement.  They agreed that if entry was easy and
effective, mergers would be competitively harmless.  They disagreed about
how entry barriers should be defined and measured.  The Harvard school
approach was reflected historically in the writings of Joe S. Bain, who defined
entry barriers as some factor that limited market entry even as firms in the
market earned returns above the competitive level.198  By contrast, the Chi-
cago school generally followed the approach proposed by Chicago economist
George J. Stigler that an entry barrier is some cost that “must be borne by a
firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the
industry.”199  The differences can be substantial.  For example, substantial
economies of scale can be an entry barrier under the Harvard approach but
not the Chicago approach.200
Bork’s view was more extreme than either approach.  He doubted that
barriers to entry existed at all, unless we define the setting of a competitive
price or a government-imposed entry restriction as an entry barrier.  For
Bork, nearly all of the things that had been characterized as entry barriers
were in fact nothing more than efficiencies that incumbent firms had
obtained but that prospective entrants had not been able to match.201  Pos-
ner provided less elaboration, but his views seem closest to Stigler’s.202  One
important consequence of Bork’s denial of barriers to entry is that he
rejected any theory of antitrust harm based on foreclosure, or the idea that a
firm could exclude others from the market by means of an anticompetitive
practice.  For Bork, the only thing that could exclude rivals was the charging
of a competitive price or a monopoly license from the government.
Today it is clear that the Harvard school has won this battle in both the
caselaw and enforcement policy.  Although the Federal Trade Commission
has on rare occasion flirted with the Stigler definition of entry barriers,203
the Harvard definition predominates in the caselaw.204  The Merger Guide-
lines effectively adopt the Harvard definition by querying whether entry will
197 Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note 191, at 2001–06.
198 JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 4–5 (1956).
199 GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968).
200 See, e.g., BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 10, at 311 (treating scale economies
as entry barriers punishes efficiencies and thereby undermines antitrust policy).
201 Id. at 310–29.
202 See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 87, at 92–93.
203 See, e.g., Eichlin Mfg. Co., 105 F.T.C. 410, 483–85, 487–88 (1985) (higher cost of
capital for entrants than for incumbents was not an “entry barrier” because the latter had
faced similar risks when they entered).
204 See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 111, ¶ 420.
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be likely to occur in response to prices at or above the competitive level.205
As under the Bainian definition, the Guidelines also query whether entry can
be expected to be timely, and sufficient to hold prices to premerger levels.
This analysis of entry in terms of timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency is
strictly in line with the Bainian approach, whose fundamental concern is
whether entry barriers will prolong supracompetitive prices.206
The Harvard definition is also the one most consistent with the con-
sumer welfare principle, for it is best able to identify situations in which high
prices are likely to be durable.  We really do not care whether incumbent
firms have surmounted some risk that enables them to charge monopoly
prices without concerns about entry.  We just want to know whether that posi-
tion exists.  This is simply another way of saying that entry barriers themselves
are not unlawful, but neither do they suffice to make anticompetitive con-
duct lawful.  The Stigler/Bork view reflected in the Chicago school theory is
much too moralistic.  It assumes that a firm that has overcome certain entry
risks is somehow “entitled” to require future entrants to surmount the same
risks, even as it is engaging in anticompetitive behavior, or that it has a free
pass to merge, even if the merger promises higher prices.  In contrast, the
Harvard approach asks the much more empirical policy question whether
high prices are likely to persist, without making value judgments about the
sequence of events that led to the current situation.207
F. Antitrust Federalism: The “State Action” Doctrine
Antitrust federalism is one area in which the economic values embodied
in the antitrust laws and the consumer welfare principle give way to another
concern: the Constitution recognizes states as well as the federal government
as sovereigns, although limited to their own spheres and under the umbrella
of the Supremacy Clause.  This presents a hard question for true believers in
antitrust: How should they react when a state does something that is clearly
anticompetitive and harms consumers, such as authorizing a cartel of dentists
to restrict the teeth whitening business to licensed practitioners?208  Here,
the Chicago school adhered closely to a welfare goal, while at least some
conservatives or libertarians remain more sympathetic to concerns about fed-
eralism, even at the cost of economic efficiency.  As an example of the latter,
Justice Alito’s dissent in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC is
a strong protest that federal antitrust policy should keep its hands off, even if
anticompetitive state policy fails to merit “a good-government seal of
205 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49, § 9.
206 Id. § 9.1 (timeliness); id. § 9.2 (likelihood); id. § 9.3 (sufficiency); see United States
v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 982 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying then existing Guidelines
standards to conclude that entry was so easy that a challenged merger was unlikely to be
anticompetitive, even though postmerger market share was close to fifty percent).
207 See Richard L. Schmalensee, Sunk Costs and Antitrust Barriers to Entry, 94 AM. ECON.
REV. 471 (2004) (defending Bainian conception of entry barriers).
208 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1108 (2015).
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approval.”209  The issue in that case was the “state action” doctrine, which
can immunize a state-authorized cartel from antitrust law.  The question of
how broadly or narrowly it should be applied has repeatedly divided the
Court.210
While Justice Alito’s position may be that of a committed federalist, it is
not reflected in the Chicago school literature.  For example, Judge Posner
applauded the Federal Trade Commission’s repeated attempts to limit or
perhaps eliminate the state action doctrine, which he saw as providing unwar-
ranted protection for professional cartels.211  In The Antitrust Paradox, Bork
barely acknowledged the state action doctrine.212  In a single sentence he
reiterated the position he had taken as Solicitor General in a government
amicus brief in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.213  That position was that an
anticompetitive state rule was immune from federal antitrust scrutiny only if
the state actually compelled the private party to act.  If the party had discre-
tion, then immunity would not apply.  The Supreme Court has never categor-
ically embraced that position.214
By contrast, Areeda and Turner were more sensitive to federalism issues.
They argued for a two-prong test.  First, there should be no state action
immunity “without adequate public supervision” of private conduct.215  Sec-
ond, state action immunity required “authorized state action clearly intended
to displace antitrust law.”216  They also rejected the compulsion requirement.
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., two years
later, the Supreme Court adopted the Areeda-Turner position virtually verba-
209 Id. at 1117 (Alito, J., dissenting).
210 See 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 221–27 (4th
ed. 2014) (discussing the cases).
211 Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72 ANTITRUST L.J.
761, 770 (2005); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System,
98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 53–54 (1984) (critical of expansive antitrust “state action” doctrine for
giving shelter to private cartels).  On the FTC’s repeated unsuccessful attempts to narrow
“state action” immunity, see 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 210, ¶ 231.
212 See BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 10, at 350 (unnumbered note).
213 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (plurality); see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at *4, Cantor, 428 U.S. 579 (No. 75-122), 1975 WL 173812 (Robert
H. Bork, Solicitor General; Thomas E. Kauper, Assistant Attorney General and head of the
antitrust division).
214 In Cantor, a deeply divided Court with no majority spoke somewhat favorably about
a compulsion requirement, finding that it was not met in a regulatory regime in which a
utility itself proposed a tariff requirement which, once adopted, became compulsory for
that firm. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 592–93.  Two years later another divided Court rejected the
requirement in City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 400, 408 (1978)
(plurality).  Subsequent decisions have consistently made clear that compulsion is not
required. See 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 210, ¶ 224c.
215 1 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 89, ¶ 213.
216 Id. ¶ 214.
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tim.217  This two-pronged Midcal approach has dominated the state action
caselaw ever since.
The Midcal position is a significant concession to federalism, although it
falls short of carte blanche.  Under it a state may regulate as anticompetitively
as it chooses, provided that it clearly articulates what it is doing and actively
supervises any private conduct.  What it cannot do, however, is simply surren-
der the power to exclude or collude to unsupervised private actors.  When
the state does that, condemnation is appropriate, as it was in North Carolina
Dental.
G. Private Enforcement
Collusion in an upstream market, such as for a raw material, often leads
to price increases that are passed down the distribution chain all the way to
consumers.  One Chicago school contribution to private enforcement doc-
trine was Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, which limits damages actions to direct
purchasers.  The Chicago school analysis was based on an assumption that
the overcharge was the correct measure of damages to each successive pur-
chaser as a cartelized good passes down the distribution chain.  While the
formulas for computing such pass on are conventional, applying them in liti-
gation would be heroic.218  Further, the argument went, a direct purchaser
limitation might actually promote enforcement by giving one entity the full
damages pool, rather than splitting the claim down the line.219  This would
result in more efficient levels of deterrence.
By contrast, Areeda and Turner found the Illinois Brick rule to be “incon-
sistent with the statutory scheme,” in that it awarded the damages to the
wrong party.220  This was true because intermediaries typically pass on more
of the overcharge than they absorb, leaving the brunt with end users.221  Fur-
ther, they argued, the true measure of the intermediary’s damage was lost
profits, not the overcharge.  So lost profits should be awarded to
intermediaries and overcharge damages to end users, whether or not they
were direct purchasers.222  In that case, there would be neither apportioning
nor duplicative recovery.
217 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980)
(“These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immunity under Parker v. Brown.
First, the challenged restraint must be ‘one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
as state policy’; second, the policy must be ‘actively supervised’ by the State itself.” (quoting
City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410)).
218 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing
to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 602, 618–20 (1979) (noting “severe difficulties of proof”).
219 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746–47 (1977).
220 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 89, ¶ 337e.
221 Id.
222 Id.; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Commentary, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-
Plus Sales, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1717, 1726–31 (1990).  This is also the position of the Antitrust
Law treatise today. See 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, ¶ 346k.
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The Supreme Court’s announcement of the indirect purchaser rule pro-
duced fierce resistance among the states, and roughly half of them have
developed Illinois Brick “repealers,” by either legislation or judicial decision.
The result has been a nightmarish system in which federal law gives direct
purchasers the entire overcharge, while the law of many states provides for
apportionment of passed on damages down the distribution chain.223
More problematically, the Illinois Brick rule was based on a misconcep-
tion that damages experts must measure passed-on damages by computing
elasticities of demand and supply as goods are passed down the distribution
stream.  In many if not most cases, however, it is quite possible to assess
passed-on damages without these computations.  For example, the very com-
monly used “yardstick” and “before and after” methodologies for computing
damages use a different set of observations.
To illustrate, suppose we observe that widgets are selling at wholesale for
ten dollars in the cartel market, but six dollars in a similar “yardstick” market
thought to be competitive.  Further we observe that wholesalers in the cartel
market are assessing a three-dollar markup, while those in the yardstick mar-
ket are assessing a four-dollar markup.  That is consistent with the general
view that intermediaries pass on a portion of the markup, while also absorb-
ing a portion.  End users end up paying thirteen dollars in the cartel market
and ten dollars in the yardstick market.  In that case the overcharge damages
of end users in the cartel market is three dollars per unit.  The wholesalers
are also injured.  Their injury is not based on the overcharge, however, but
on lost profits.  They are injured by one dollar per unit sold, because their
markup on each unit is one dollar less than the yardstick markup.  They are
also injured by the cartel output reduction which reduces their volume.  The
before and after method takes the same approach except that it examines the
same market prior to the formation of the cartel or subsequent to its dissolu-
tion, or both.224  To be sure, the real world provides difficulties that compli-
cate the measure of damages, but the impact on indirect purchasers is no
more unmanageable than most of these.  In light of the state-federal mess
that Illinois Brick has produced, it is time for that rule to be reconsidered.225
The most important antitrust development in private enforcement in
the late 1970s was the “antitrust injury” doctrine, which aligned private enti-
tlement to sue more closely with the goals of the antitrust laws.  It was sub-
stantially the creation of Areeda, who used the then-pending Brunswick Corp.
223 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 16.6d, at 839–40 (5th ed.
2016).
224 See Andrew I. Gavil, Thinking Outside the Illinois Brick Box: A Proposal for Reform, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 181 (2009).
225 At this writing, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in an indirect purchaser
case concerned mainly with identification of the direct purchaser in a complex distribution
chain.  It is unlikely to reconsider the rule itself.  Pepper v. Apple, Inc. (In re Apple iPhone
Antitrust Litig.), 846 F.3d 313 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2647 (2018).  On
complexities in the distribution chain that can affect indirect purchaser lawsuits, see 2A
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, ¶ 346j.
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v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. case as an example of an antitrust violation for
which damages should not be recovered.226 Brunswick involved a vertical
merger.  Defendant Brunswick was a major producer of bowling equipment,
which set up turnkey bowling alleys, providing them with the equipment they
needed to create a functioning business.  It also had a program of acquiring
foundering alleys who were unable to pay their bills.  The City of Pueblo,
Colorado, had two major bowling alleys.  One was the plaintiff and the other
was a struggling alley heavily indebted to Brunswick.  Brunswick then
acquired the failing alley and placed it on a firm financial footing.  The plain-
tiff argued that this acquisition was an unlawful merger.  Further, absent the
merger the rival alley would have gone out of business, leaving the plaintiff as
the dominant firm.  Given the acquisition, however, the plaintiff was forced
to compete with the newly rehabilitated alley.
The plaintiff’s theory of action essentially turned antitrust policy on its
head.  It was clearly injured in fact by the merger, but it wanted to use anti-
trust law to protect itself from competition.  The merger “harm” of which it
was complaining was the rehabilitation of a rival that preserved competition
in the plaintiff’s community.  Writing for the Court, liberal Justice Thurgood
Marshall developed the “antitrust injury” doctrine, requiring that private
antitrust claims be reasonably related to the reason we have antitrust laws.227
Even assuming that the vertical merger in question was unlawful, the plaintiff
was injured by increased rather than lessened competition.
The antitrust injury doctrine is one of the most frequently used doc-
trines today to limit recoveries by antitrust plaintiffs who are seeking to use
the antitrust laws for anticompetitive purposes, or else for purposes that have
nothing to do with competition.  More than 1600 federal antitrust cases have
cited it,228 and it governs both damages actions and equity suits.229  Impor-
tantly, it is generally not a doctrine that relies on proven facts, but rather on
the plaintiff’s theory of harm.  As a result, cases can be addressed on antitrust
injury grounds on motions to dismiss by simply assessing the plaintiff’s theory
of injury.
III. DIAGNOSING ANTITRUST’S SHORTCOMINGS
Is antitrust living up to expectations?  Answering that question requires
that we identify reasonable goals.  If antitrust’s agenda is limited to practices
that threaten low prices, increased output and product or service quality,
then antitrust has a fairly clear path.  One should not understate the difficul-
226 Areeda, supra note 125, at 1132 (discussing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977)).
227 Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488–89.
228 According to a Westlaw search conducted on Jan. 5, 2018, 1676 federal court deci-
sions have cited Brunswick and mentioned “antitrust injury.”  On the “antitrust injury” doc-
trine as a limitation on antitrust standing, see 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 65,
¶ 337.
229 See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (extending antitrust
injury doctrine to lawsuits seeking an injunction).
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ties, for antitrust under the consumer welfare principle requires rigorous fact
finding and economic analysis in order to identify competitively harmful
practices.
The general welfare approach on the right and more populist
approaches on the left have important characteristics in common.  Both den-
igrate the importance of high output and low prices.  They are also harder to
apply in a coherent way, because they require tradeoffs that are often difficult
to articulate or quantify.  Populism in particular requires antitrust policy to
be involved in questions about wealth distribution and wages, small business
welfare, or limiting of political as opposed to purely economic power.  Popu-
lism’s real bite occurs when an antitrust rule leads to reduced output and
higher prices in order to accomplish one of these goals.  Further, not only do
these various goals trade against lower prices, they can trade against each
other as well.230
The real problem of a general welfare test lies in its untested assump-
tions about competitive harm and efficiency.  Bork simply assumed that pro-
ductive efficiencies, including efficiencies in distribution, explained virtually
every practice other than horizontal price fixing.231  He also believed, how-
ever, that efficiencies were not susceptible of individual proof.  Rather they
must simply be assumed.232  That pair of assumptions has led to an antitrust
policy that is tolerant of a great deal of market power without any serious
evidence that efficiencies justify it.  Indeed, when legal regimes such as
merger law require serious proof of efficiencies in order to offset a prima
facie case of competitive harm, firms are rarely able to provide it.  This is true
even though they themselves were responsible for implementing the claimed
efficiencies in question, and thus are in the best position to explain and jus-
tify them.233  In any event, even if efficiencies do explain many practices, the
benefits are not getting passed on to consumers.
A. The Need for Coherent and More Administrable Goals
Notwithstanding difficulties in its application, antitrust under the con-
sumer welfare principle can be designed so as to maximize predictability and
minimize interest group conflict.  The goal of the antitrust laws should be to
enable markets to produce the highest output of the highest quality goods
and services consistent with competition.  Along with this will come lower
prices.
That goal provides a metric, which is manageable in theory.  In fact, the
only other coherent and measurable antitrust goal that has been articulated
is general welfare, which is the total welfare experienced by everyone affected
by a situation, including producers as well as consumers.  One enormous
230 See infra notes 243–44 and accompanying text.
231 See Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle, supra note 1, (manuscript at
2).
232 Id. (manuscript at 11).
233 See Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Efficiencies, supra note 35, 724–26.
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problem of general welfare theories is that they are tolerant of unacceptably
large amounts of market power and high prices.234  Another problem is that
we lack the econometric tools to apply them in litigation in any but the clear-
est cases.235
Depending on assumptions, the theoretical difference between con-
sumer welfare tests and tests that take producer welfare into account can be
large.  In litigation, however, the choice between the tests rarely matters.236
Assuming we reject Bork’s position that efficiencies should simply be pre-
sumed without proof,237 the difference between consumer welfare and gen-
eral welfare has bite in one situation: namely, where a practice is actually
proven to reduce output and increases price, thus injuring consumers, but
the gains that accrue to producers or others are determined to be larger than
the losses experienced by consumers.  Those cases require measurement of a
welfare tradeoff.  This means, first, that consumer losses must be quantified.
We need to know the extent to which a practice raises price and reduces
output, and thus the cost of inefficient consumer substitutions.  This requires
information not only about the size of an output reduction and price
increase (or quality loss), but also about the shape of the demand curve in
the affected range.  Having measured this, we would also have to measure the
gains experienced by producers and others.  In the simplest case involving an
efficiency-created cost reduction but no product change, we would need to
know the amount of the reduction and the per unit cost savings.  If the sav-
ings were in increased quality, we would have to be able to quantify that, and
quality-adjusted output is tricky to measure.  Once measured, these con-
sumer losses and producer gains would have to be netted against each other.
Importantly, any claimed efficiencies in such cases would be accruing at
lower output levels than obtained prior to the practice.  Economies of scale,
the most common efficiency, generally accrues at higher outputs, not lower
ones.238  If output is as high or higher under the challenged practice con-
sumers are not injured at all and there will not be a welfare tradeoff.239
By contrast, assessing a particular antitrust problem under a consumer
welfare test requires no more than an ordinal estimate of the direction of
market output, whether up or down.240  We do not need to know how much
market output or quality changes, but only that it does and in which direc-
234 See Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle, supra note 1, (manuscript at
3–8).
235 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Progressive Antitrust, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 92.
236 See the Williamson “tradeoff” model and the accompanying figure in Oliver E. Wil-
liamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 21
(1968), reprinted in BORK, PARADOX, supra note 10, at 107.  On the immateriality of the test
to actual litigation outcomes, see Hovenkamp, supra note 235.
237 See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text.
238 See Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Efficiencies, supra note 35, at 734–35.
239 Id.
240 One must distinguish market output from firm output.  For example, in an exclu-
sion case the defendant’s output may go up to the extent that it is anticompetitively captur-
ing sales from others.  Overall market output, however, will go down.
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tion.241  There are no tradeoffs to be made.  Focusing on output is usually
better than focusing on price, particularly in cases involving monopsony.
When monopsony power is being exercised the relevant purchasing prices go
down, but output goes down as well.242
Sometimes an assessment of market power can provide a simplifying
screen.  In all cases where output effects are not intuitively obvious the mar-
ket power requirement can serve to screen out harmless cases.  For example,
if a few insignificant firms that lack any market power form a venture that
causes them to lose sales, the venture will be unprofitable but consumers will
not be harmed.  The venturers’ output will decline, but not that of the mar-
ket as a whole.  Antitrust harm requires that an actor with market power can
profitably reduce the output of the market as a whole.  In such a case, a
market power inquiry can be a simpler way of getting to an answer than
direct measurement under any welfare test, including consumer welfare.
In sharp contrast, the broader goals identified by movement antitrust,
including control of political power and wealth equality, job provision and
wages, and protection of small business, are much more difficult to assess.
They often operate at cross purposes.  For example, a policy of increasing
worker compensation is likely to harm small business more than larger ones.
Large firms historically pay higher wages and salaries than smaller firms,
although the difference is shrinking.243  For example, Amazon, a frequent
target of movement antitrust, pays higher wages for the same jobs than its
competitors.244  Breaking up large firms may reduce rather than increase
employment, and may force wages lower.  Likewise, a policy of protecting
small business is likely to result in higher product prices, which in turn will
lead to lower output and, a fortiori, fewer jobs.  Most importantly is metrics:
one cannot simply send federal judges out with a hodgepodge of conflicting
goals and tell them to make some antitrust policy.
The consumer welfare principle speaks to some of these goals, at least
indirectly.245  For example, although wealth equality and job creation are not
separately articulated goals of antitrust under the consumer welfare princi-
ple, competitive markets are very likely conducive to more appealing distribu-
241 Or in an attempt case, that there is a dangerous probability that if the conduct runs
its course market output will go down.
242 See infra Section III.C.
243 See, e.g., Charles Brown & James Medoff, The Employer Size-Wage Effect, 97 J. POL.
ECON. 1027, 1027 (1989); Thierry Lallemand et al., Why Do Large Firms Pay Higher Wages?
Evidence From Matched Worker-Firm Data, 26 INT’L. J. MANPOWER 705, 705 (2005).
244 As a result, Amazon is less impacted by increases in minimum wages. See Jeremy
Bowman, As Minimum Wages Go Up, Amazon.com Looks Like the Bigger Winner, MOTLEY FOOL
(Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2016/04/08/as-minimum-wages-
go-up-amazoncom-looks-like-the-bi.aspx.
245 See Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality,
104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1 (2015) (discussing, inter alia, the relationship between market
power and inequality and offering several proposals for using the antitrust laws to address
inequality issues).
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tions of wealth than monopolized ones.246  To be sure, even a highly
competitive economy may experience uneven distribution of wealth, particu-
larly when we take innovation into account.
Further, to the extent antitrust under the consumer welfare principle
seeks to maximize output, it should also maximize employment, depending
on the extent of productive efficiencies.  In addition, as noted below, anti-
trust properly has a place in controlling restraints on competition in labor
markets, and facilitating competitive labor markets may go a long way toward
combatting wage suppression.247
An antitrust goal of pursuing wealth distribution independently of out-
put maximization would suffer the same fate as so many populist antitrust
goals.  There is no metric that can be applied to it.  Should plaintiffs who are
poorer than defendants always win?  If not, how do we choose?  How would
one go about identifying a practice that produces higher output and lower
prices but yet should be condemned because it produces a less appealing
distribution of wealth?  The same thing is true of employment goals.  In gen-
eral, pursuing higher output can be trusted to yield higher employment.  But
another way to keep employment up is to reduce productive efficiency.  So
should there be some set of practices that yield higher product output and
lower prices, but that should be condemned because they also produce pro-
duction efficiencies that reduce the number of jobs?  If that is our starting
principle, how far should it be pursued?
B. The Market Power Problem
As measured by price-cost margins, market power in the economy is ris-
ing.248  The increase began to occur in the early 1980s, at about the same
time as the Reagan-era antitrust revolution.249  It is also worth noting that
two of the principal targets of movement antitrust today—Google and Ama-
zon—are not significant contributors to this phenomenon.  Google’s most
common price to consumers is zero, and Amazon’s margins are among the
lowest in all retailing.  To be sure, either company might be engaging in
anticompetitive practices.  Their contracts with advertisers or suppliers might
be unreasonably exclusionary, or they might use most-favored-nation or
other loyalty-inducing long-term contracts in anticompetitive ways.  In addi-
tion, we might want to place a price on the information that consumers pro-
246 See, e.g., Sean Ennis et al., Inequality: A Hidden Cost of Market Power (2017)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Inequality-hidden-
cost-market-power-2017.pdf.  Even some of those in the neo-Brandeis movement agree. See
Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution
and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 238–45 (2017).
247 See infra Section III.D.
248 See Jan De Loecker & Jan Eeckhout, The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic
Implications (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23687, 2017), http://
www.nber.org/papers/w23687.
249 See id. at 16 (noting profit rate relative to GDP grew fourfold during the period
1980–2014).
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vide when they use these platforms.  Finally, they might be making
problematic acquisitions of smaller firms.  But one need not abandon well-
developed antitrust tools for finding power and anticompetitive effects in
order to evaluate these practices.
Changes in antitrust policy may be a factor in this rise of price-cost mar-
gins—or not.  Other things are at work here.  First, during this same period
the economy became far more digitized and information based.  The result is
significant changes in cost structure, with a much higher percentage of
American investment being in fixed-cost assets.  This would serve to increase
price-cost margins.  The authors purport to account for this change.  In any
event, to the extent the rise in margins results from an increase in fixed costs,
it is not an antitrust problem.
Second, as a result of decades of anti-union politics and legislation,
wages have been suppressed in favor of company profits.  That is to say, even
as profits have risen dramatically, real wages have remained constant at best
and labor participation represents a steeply declining section of industry
returns, even if adjusted by changes in technology that reduce the demand
for labor.250  Most aspects of this are not an antitrust problem either,
although we show later that there are strong arguments for paying more
attention to labor market concentration, particularly in merger cases.251
Third, to the extent that merger policy is underdeterrent, too many
mergers have very likely resulted in non-cost-justified price increases.  As
noted below, merger policy needs to become more aggressive to keep higher
product prices in check.
Finally, there is a clear link between market competitiveness and the dis-
tribution of wealth.  While antitrust has no place in addressing distribution of
wealth aside from concerns for competition, the fact is that markets with high
output and lower price cost margins can also yield greater amounts of wealth
equality.252  Here, the consumer welfare principle has a decided advantage
over more general measures of welfare.253  Much of the increased value that
results from a general welfare standard is wealth that accrues to producers.
The same thing is true of Bork’s approach.  By contrast, the consumer wel-
fare standard is least tolerant of market power because it does not include
producer profits in its welfare calculus.
C. Market Concentration and Merger Policy
On market structure, antitrust can take one of three quite different
paths.  The first, which is Bork’s approach of ignoring concentration and
pursuing only monopoly or explicit price-fixing, has been completely dis-
250 One site that collects these data is the Pew Research Center. See generally PEW RES.
CTR., pewresearch.org (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
251 See infra Section III.D.
252 See Baker & Salop, supra note 245, at 5–10.
253 Id. at 16–17.
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credited in the literature.254  At the opposite extreme, and consistent with
movement antitrust, is the view that antirust should pursue high concentra-
tion for its own sake.  It could do so by creating a metric arbitrarily—for
example, simply saying that no merger will be approved if it results in fewer
than ten firms (or some other number) in a market, regardless of costs, econ-
omies of scale, or other factors that determine output and price.  This
approach denies many firms the economies that result from larger size.  So
even though prices might in some cases be closer to cost, costs would be
higher.
The middle alternative is that market structure is relevant but only as a
way of getting at concerns about output and price.  That is, high concentra-
tion becomes an antitrust problem when it leads to lower output and higher
prices.  This of course imposes on antitrust enforcers a need to assess the
relationship between concentration and output.  For example, the structural
thresholds in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines are not placed there
for their own sake, but only because they support an inference that as market
structures become more concentrated, the dangers of collusion or collusion-
like behavior become more severe.255  Further, at different times people
have held very different views about the relationship between high concen-
tration and high profits or, more accurately, high margins.  Bork and some
members of the old Chicago school substantially denied that there was any
relationship at all.256  By contrast, for followers of the SCP paradigm in the
1950s and 1960s, industrial concentration was the raison d’eˆtre for antitrust
policy.257  The current literature continues to find a troublesome relation-
ship between high concentration and high price-cost margins.258
“Industrial concentration,” as the literature often calls it,259 is often mis-
understood by those who see high concentration as a primary antitrust tar-
get. First, high concentration operates as a means and not as an end in itself.
Second, the term refers to the number of firms in a properly defined market
and, as such, has little to do with absolute size.260  For example, if delivered
cement (“redi-mix”) is a relevant market, a small community with two such
firms would exhibit a high level of market concentration, even though the
firms each have a dozen employees, two or three trucks, and few other assets.
Premixed concrete can be delivered over only a small geographic range,
meaning that the number of competing firms can be small as well.  By con-
trast, Kroger is an enormous player in the national retail grocery market, with
254 See Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note 191, at 1998.
255 See id. at 2014–15.
256 See supra notes 182–84 and accompanying text.
257 See supra notes 176–79 and accompanying text.
258 See Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note 191; Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Rein-
vigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK
235, 239, 252 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008); Steven C. Salop, The Evolution and Vitality of
Merger Presumptions: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 269, 299–304 (2015).
259 E.g., INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING, supra note 181.
260 Although size distribution can be relevant, but only as a mechanism for predicting
output and price. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 223, § 12.4a2.
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some 2800 stores, but that market overall is fairly unconcentrated and even
Kroger has less than ten percent of it.261
Even during the high point of antitrust concern articulated as combat-
ting industrial concentration, all sides understood that industrial concentra-
tion was not being attacked for its own sake, but rather because of a
widespread belief that higher concentration led to lower output, higher
prices, less competitiveness, or poorer performance measured in some other
way.  The first generation of concentration studies in the 1950s and 1960s
attached the problem to correlations between concentration and accounting
profits.262  Today the concern about industrial concentration remains robust,
but its focus has shifted to high price-cost margins.  As firms face fewer com-
petitors, price-cost margins tend to rise.263
So what should antitrust do about it?  The correct rules are empirically
determined, moving targets, which change not only with further economic
theory and empirical study, but also with changes in both production and
transportation technology, as well as demographics.  The area that exhibits
this most strongly is mergers, with enforcement policy going from severely
overdeterrent in the 1960s to underdeterrent today.  These changes also
explain why we have had several sets of horizontal merger guidelines since
the first ones were issued in 1968,264 and why we will very likely continue to
have new sets every several years.  Intelligent policy in these areas changes
with further study about the structure and operation of markets, as well as
with new technologies that often serve to make markets more or less
competitive.
The relationship between concentration and output is a central question
for antitrust policy.  The history of antitrust reveals a great deal of anticon-
centration rhetoric, but little in the way of accomplishment.265  In that
regard, the safest interpretation of a recently proposed Senate bill, the Con-
solidation Prevention and Competition Promotion Act of 2017,266 is that it
targets increases in concentration that also tend to reduce output.  The bill is
unlikely to pass in the immediate future, and some portions of it might be
261 See Market Share of U.S. Food and Beverage Purchases in 2016, by Company*, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/240481/food-market-share-of-the-leading-food-retailers
-of-north-america/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018).
262 See INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING, supra note 181 (recounting the
debate thoroughly).
263 See, e.g., Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note 191; Michael Salinger, The Concentration-
Margins Relationship Reconsidered, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY:
MICROECONOMICS 287 (Martin Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1990).
264 The Guidelines were issued in 1968; 1982, revised in 1984; 1992, revised in 1997;
and 2010.  The full text of the 2010 and 1997 revision versions can be found on the FTC’s
website. Merger Review, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/merger-
review (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).  All of them can be found on the Antitrust Division
website. Merger Enforcement, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atr/merger-
enforcement (last updated Oct. 11, 2018).
265 See Kovacic, supra note 1, at 1105 n.4.
266 S. 1812, 115th Cong. (2017).
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regarded as movement antitrust.  Nevertheless, the bill states a concern for
higher prices and low quality,267 and a goal of clarifying “that the Clayton Act
prohibits mergers that, as a result of consolidation, may materially lower
quality, reduce choice, reduce innovation, exclude competitors, increase
entry barriers, or increase price.”268  Properly applied, the Clayton Act
should already be doing these things.  The bill would change the Clayton Act
incipiency standard from condemning mergers that may “substantially”
lessen competition to those that would “materially” lessen competition.269
While the precise meaning is unclear, “materially” is presumably triggered at
a lower level than “substantially.”  So far so good.  If enacted, this portion of
the bill could change the inferences to be drawn from given levels of market
concentration, and also alter the burdens of proof, but not the underlying
goals.
Section 3(3)(1) of the proposed legislation would permit the agencies,
although not private parties, to challenge a merger if “the acquisition would
lead to a significant increase in market concentration in any line of com-
merce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country.”270
Then the defendants can rebut by showing that the material injury to compe-
tition will be unlikely to occur.  This is not an improvement in the current
analysis of mergers.  Under the Guidelines’ current approach, a prima facie
case against a coordination-facilitating merger depends on two things: first is
the overall level of market postmerger concentration; second is the size of
the increase in concentration caused by the merger.271  The proposed provi-
sion effectively drops the first part of the inquiry without any explanation why
that is important except perhaps that the bill is intended to pursue concen-
tration for its own sake.
At least this first provision applies to horizontal mergers, because only
they increase market concentration.  However, section 3(3)(2) of the bill
then permits the agencies to pursue mergers between firms that have
reached a given size threshold, measured by dollar amount, without regard
to their competitive relationship.  That is, it applies to mergers that are
neither horizontal nor vertical.272  If the size threshold is reached, the bur-
267 Id. § 2(a)(6) (finding “the anticompetitive effects of market power created by con-
centration include higher prices, lower quality, significantly less choice, reduced innova-
tion, foreclosure of competitors, increased entry barriers, and monopsony power”).
268 Id. § 2(b)(1).
269 Id. § 2(b)(1)–(2).  On “incipiency” in merger policy, see Hovenkamp, supra note
112, at 1, 3.
270 S. 1812, § 3(3)(1).
271 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49, § 5.3 (regarding concentration
increases in the range of 100–200 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index points as significant,
depending on whether overall postmerger concentration is between 1500 and 2500 (mod-
erately concentrated), or exceeds 2500 (highly concentrated)); see also Hovenkamp & Sha-
piro, supra note 191, at 2003–08 (defending this approach).
272 S. 1812, § 3(3)(2).  The relevant dollar amounts are spelled out:
[A]s a result of such acquisition, the acquiring person would hold an aggregate
total amount of the voting securities and assets of the acquired person in excess
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den shifts to the defendants to show that the acquisition would not tend to
materially lessen competition, with “materially” defined as “more than a de
minimis amount.”273  Even at the high point of merger enforcement aggres-
siveness in the 1960s and 1970s the agencies had at least a theory about how
nonhorizontal mergers might reduce competition and what the evidentiary
requirements were.274  Because nonhorizontal mergers do not increase con-
centration, this section can only be understood as having absolute firm size as
its target.
Perhaps the proposed legislation attempts to address—although awk-
wardly—a serious and very real problem: too many recently approved merg-
ers have led to higher prices.275  That tells us that the currently employed
standards for collusion-facilitating mergers are too tolerant.  In that case,
however, a better solution would be to revise the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index numbers in the Guidelines, perhaps back to earlier levels in which
postmerger the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index numbers exceeding 1800 were
counted as highly problematic, and then employ the burden shift at that
stage.  Then the agencies need to stick to the numbers and convince the
courts about the importance of doing so.  One reason the Guidelines were
revised was that the concentration numbers being applied were much higher
than the concentration numbers that the Guidelines stated.  That is, the
agencies were not following their own Guidelines.276
D. Antitrust and Labor Market Monopsony
Labor market issues show up in antitrust policy in several ways.  First, a
merger or other practice that results in an actual output reduction and price
increase in the product market will very likely lead to a job reduction as well.
of $5,000,000,000 (as adjusted and published for each fiscal year beginning after
September 30, 2018, in the same manner as provided in section 8(a)(5) to reflect
the percentage change in the gross national product for such fiscal year com-
pared to the gross national product for the year ending September 30, 2017);
or . . . the person acquiring or the person being acquired has assets, net annual
sales, or a market capitalization greater than $100,000,000,000 (as so adjusted and
published); and . . . as a result of such acquisition, the acquiring person would
hold an aggregate total amount of the voting securities and assets of the acquired
person in excess of $50,000,000 (as so adjusted and published) . . . .
Id. § 3(3)(B)(i)–(ii).
273 Id. § 3(3).
274 These theories are developed in 5 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, ch. 11,
which discusses potential competition and other “conglomerate” mergers.
275 See discussion supra note 195 and accompanying text.
276 See DEBORAH L. FEINSTEIN, ANTITRUST SOURCE, THE REVISED MERGER GUIDELINES:
DID THE AGENCIES HEED THE LESSONS OF THE PAST? 1, 3 (2010), https://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Oct10_Feinstein10_21f.authcheck
dam.pdf; see also John Kwoka, Reviving Merger Control: A Comprehensive Plan for
Reforming Policy and Practice (Oct. 9, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.anti
trustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Kwoka-Reviving-Merger-Control-October-
2018.pdf.
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Ceteris paribus, lower output requires less labor.  Traditionally, when mergers
are challenged in the merging firms’ output (product) markets, the impact
on labor is ignored.  Second, a practice that results in lower prices and
higher output should increase jobs.  Once again, if the challenged restraint is
in the product market, litigants and courts generally ignore effects on
employment.  Third, a practice that results in both lower prices and greater
productive efficiency could either increase or decrease jobs depending on
the size of the resulting output increase and the nature and extent of the
efficiency gains.  For example, a merger that enables the postmerger firm to
adopt labor saving devices or procedures could certainly reduce the demand
for labor, but it is not antitrust’s purpose to interfere with gains from produc-
tive efficiency, any more than it is patent law’s purpose to deny patentability
to labor-saving devices or processes.
Antitrust under the consumer welfare principle has a generally positive
effect on employment, even though maximizing employment is not its focus.
The correlation between low prices, high product output, and employment is
not perfect, but it is a correlation nonetheless.  That does raise a second
question, however, which is whether antitrust should ever depart from the
consumer welfare principle in order to improve employment outcomes?
That is, are there situations in which antitrust policy should favor something
other than low prices and high product output in order to increase either
wages or the number of jobs?  For example, should it oppose firms’ adoption
of labor-saving technologies, or mergers that reduce costs, simply because the
cost reductions are thought to reduce the number of jobs?  Once again, if the
answer is yes, then the next question is metering.  If a tradeoff is to be made
between low consumer prices and increased employment, where do we draw
the line?
Further, why use antitrust as the vehicle?  If we really wanted to preserve
jobs by limiting productive efficiency, changes in patent law would be a more
direct route.  For example, by denying patents to tractors, washing machines,
automobiles, and microprocessor chips, we might reduce the incentive to
invent these things.  Such a policy might preserve jobs by forcing people to
stay with more labor-intensive technologies.  In the context of patent law
such a proposal sounds perverse, but it is no less perverse in competition
policy, even though the Supreme Court once pursued it.277  Nevertheless,
277 See generally Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 372–73 (1962) (Harlan,
J., concurring) (condemning vertical merger because it enabled the firm either to produce
at a lower cost or else to produce better quality at the same cost); see also Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 517–18 (3d Cir. 1969) (condemning a
merger between a manufacturer of rolling mills, used in the production of steel, and a
manufacturer of the electric hook-ups for such mills, because the merger would create “the
only company capable of designing, producing and installing a complete metal rolling
mill,” and this “would raise higher the already significant barriers to the entry of others”).
During its heyday, the Robinson-Patman Act was often employed to the same end. See, e.g.,
Anderson Foreign Motors, Inc. v. New Eng. Toyota Distrib., Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1383,
1386–87, 1386 n.4 (D. Mass. 1980) (on “backhaul” allowances); Granting of “Back-Haul”
Allowances to Customers Picking Up Their Own Order, 32 Fed. Reg. 14694 (Oct. 24,
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the analogies cannot be ignored: condemning a merger because it reduces
costs by using less labor-intensive technologies or forms of organization is no
less perverse than denying a patent for the same reason.  It would put govern-
ment in the job of mandating more costly production in order to keep more
labor-intensive firms or technologies in the market.
This hardly denies antitrust policy a role in labor markets.  It does sug-
gest, however, that the same consumer welfare principles that apply in prod-
uct markets should be applied to labor markets as well—with a little
modification to account for the fact that workers sell, rather than purchase,
their labor.  Problematically, the markets in which labor is purchased are
often less competitive than the product markets in which laborers work.278
In fact, suppression of labor market competition is an area in which the anti-
trust laws are often underenforced.  The problems can be by and large
addressed within the existing statutory framework of the antitrust laws, and
without requiring abandonment of the consumer welfare principle.  The
issue is relevant to several practices that are reachable under the antitrust
laws, including unilateral acts of wage suppression,279 noncompetition agree-
ments, price-fixing and market division in wage and salary markets, and
mergers threatening suppression of wages or salaries.280
Business firms are purchasers rather than sellers of labor, so agreements
that have anticompetitive effects on employment invoke the monopsony
problem.  Addressing monopsony power under antitrust law can be confus-
ing because of a tendency to presume that low prices are invariably good
ones.281  The main practical problem is distinguishing between aggressive
1967).  Under the policy a seller could not compensate a firm for making a return trip
from a delivery with freight moving in the return direction.  The effect was to incentivize
trucks to return empty in order to avoid injury to smaller rivals who were not in a position
to take advantage of backhauls.  On the Robinson-Patman Act’s impairments of productive
efficiency in order to protect rivals, see 14 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2340b3
(forthcoming 4th ed. 2019).
278 See Jose´ Azar et al., Labor Market Concentration 7–8 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 24147, 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w24147; see also Suresh
Naidu et al., Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 14), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3129221.
279 See, e.g., Steward Health Care Sys., LLC v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 997 F.
Supp. 2d 142, 156–57 (D.R.I. 2014) (sustaining section 2 claim of monopsonistic suppres-
sion of health provider prices).
280 On the latter, see Ioana Marinescu & Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers in
Labor Markets, 93 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 1), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3124483.
281 See ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
(2010); V. Bhaskar et al., Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competition in Labor Markets, 16 J.
ECON. PERSP. 155, 172 (2002) (discussing monopsony with labor markets); see also Vogel v.
Am. Soc’y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[B]uyer cartels, the object of
which is to force the prices that suppliers charge the members of the cartel below the
competitive level, are illegal per se.  Just as a sellers’ cartel enables the charging of monop-
oly prices, a buyers’ cartel enables the charging of monopsony prices; and monopoly and
monopsony are symmetrical distortions of competition from an economic standpoint.”
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but competitive buying, which yields higher output; and monopsony, which
ordinarily reduces output.
Under monopsony, a buyer with market power in its buying market
reduces its purchases to infracompetitive levels, thereby reducing the supply.
This is simply a monopoly output reduction turned upside down.  Monop-
sony in labor markets can be hard to assess, because workers do not have
easily measurable marginal cost functions.282  Further, labor output may not
be as responsive as manufacturing is to a monopsonistic price reduction.
Conceptually, however, the problem is straightforward.  In a perfectly com-
petitive labor market an employer will pay precisely the marginal value of a
worker.  For example, if the worker contributes ten dollars per hour to the
firm’s value then the wage in a perfectly competitive equilibrium would be
ten dollars per hour.  However, if the employer can profitably suppress the
hiring market by paying eight dollars per hour and hiring fewer workers or
using them for fewer hours, then it would be producing less but would be
earning more from each hour of labor.283  So an exercise of monopsony
power involves suppression of an input, just as an exercise of monopoly
power involves suppression of output.284  If the range of hiring firms compet-
ing in a given area is small, the result can be suppression of wages.  That is,
just as high concentration leads to high price-cost margins in product sales,
so too its leads to infracompetitive prices in employment markets.  High
labor concentration is not uncommon because employment markets are fre-
quently smaller than product markets.285
Horizontal cartel agreements among employers suppressing wages are
unlawful per se, and several decisions have condemned them.286  These
(citation omitted)). See generally Robert J. Thornton, Retrospectives: How Joan Robinson and
B. L. Hallward Named Monopsony, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 257 (2004).
282 On some of the measurement difficulties, see generally William M. Boal & Michael
R. Ransom, Monopsony in the Labor Market, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 86 (1997); Hovenkamp,
Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle, supra note 1; Douglas O. Staiger et al., Is There Monop-
sony in the Labor Market? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 28 J. LAB. ECON. 211 (2010).
283 See Marinescu & Hovenkamp, supra note 280, (manuscript at 12–13).
284 Just as the monopolist seeks to maximize profits by equating marginal cost and mar-
ginal revenue, the monopsonist tries to equate marginal outlay with marginal revenue. See
HOVENKAMP, supra note 223, § 1.2b n.25.
285 See supra text accompanying notes 269–72.
286 See In re VHS of Mich., Inc., 601 F. App’x 342 (6th Cir. 2015) (approving employee
class action in case alleging that eight hospitals conspired to suppress nurses’ wages); Todd
v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.) (involving employees’ allega-
tions of information exchanges sufficient to support claim of conspiracy to suppress wages
of oil refining defendants); Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir.
1998) (condemning agreement among NCAA colleges to limit salaries of junior basketball
coaches); Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, No. 18-cv-0133, 2018 WL 3631577 (S.D.
Ill. July 31, 2018) (sustaining in part claim that fast food franchisor required franchisees to
put intrafranchise no-poaching agreements in employment contracts); Deslandes v.
McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17-c-4857, 2018 WL 3105955 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (simi-
lar); Aya Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. AMN Healthcare, Inc., No. 17-cv-205, 2018 WL 3032552
(S.D. Cal. June 19, 2018) (refusing to dismiss complaint that contractor require no-poach-
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agreements can be either explicit price agreements, or in some cases market
division agreements.287  Antitrust law permits multiemployer agreements on
wages or other terms of employment only in the context of collective bargain-
ing, under the so-called “nonstatutory” labor exemption from the antitrust
laws.288  A naked agreement suppressing competition in hiring should be
treated no differently than a price-fixing or market-division agreement gov-
erning sale of a product.  While these are often criminal violations, however,
wage-suppression agreements have historically warranted only civil actions.289
That may reflect some lack of familiarity with such agreements—or it may
reflect a supposition that naked wage-fixing agreements are somehow less
serious than product price-fixing agreements.  In any event, they should be
treated symmetrically.  Naked wage-suppression agreements should be crimi-
nal offenses under the same set of conditions that product price-fixing agree-
ing agreements among its various subcontractors); California v. eBay, Inc., No, 12-cv-05874,
2014 WL 4273888 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2014) (approving settlement in case alleging agree-
ment among tech firms not to hire each other’s employees); In re High-Tech Emp. Anti-
trust Litig., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1189 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (tech firms’ “no poaching”
agreement not to solicit one another’s employees and certifying employee class); Hall v.
Thomas, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (N.D. Ala. 2010) (excluding expert testimony concerning
causation in case alleging that defendant unlawfully suppressed wages of workers in poultry
processing plant); Reed v. Advocate Health Care, 268 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (involving
complaint of hospital conspiracy to suppress nurses’ wages; denying class certification for
failure to show impact by common proof); Mueller v. Wellmark, Inc., 818 N.W.2d 244
(Iowa 2012) (rejecting most parts of claim that health insurer paid discriminatorily low
reimbursement rates to chiropractors); see also Manitowoc Co. v. Lanning, 906 N.W.2d 130
(Wis. 2018) (divided state supreme court condemning antipoaching agreements after con-
cluding that statute has same meaning as section 1 of the Sherman Act); cf. Mendoza v.
Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2002) (sustaining documented agricultural labor-
ers’ complaint that fruit growers imported undocumented workers with intent of sup-
pressing wages of documented workers).  See generally Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive
Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789 (2015);
Robert E. Bloch & Scott P. Perlman, Reed v. Advocate Health Care: Anatomy of Class Certifi-
cation Proceedings in a Wage Conspiracy Case, ANTITRUST, Summer 2010, at 63, 63.
287 For example, antipoaching agreements, such as described in In re High-Tech Emp.
Antitrust Litig., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1167, operate as market division agreements rather than
explicit price-setting agreements.  The employers are not fixing prices but rather making it
more difficult for employees to move from one employer to another.  In this case the
agreements forbad participants from calling one another’s software engineers to offer
them an opportunity to switch jobs.  The government had obtained a consent decree in
the same case.  United States v. Lucasfilm, Inc., No. 10-cv-02220, 2011 WL 2636850 (D.D.C.
June 3, 2011).
288 E.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (sustaining multiemployer
union contract involving NFL team owners); see 1B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 62,
¶ 256.
289 E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires eBay to End
Anticompetitive “No Poach” Hiring Agreements (May 1, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/justice-department-requires-ebay-end-anticompetitive-no-poach-hiring-
agreements.
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ments are.  In early 2018 the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division
announced its intention to prosecute antipoaching agreements criminally.290
The labor monopsony issue also arises in merger cases, where it can be
particularly difficult to assess.  A postmerger firm’s ability to bargain for lower
outlays for wages or salaries could be regarded as either an “efficiency
defense” to the merger, or else as an exercise of monopsony power.  Suppose
that two hospitals in a concentrated market should merge, offering as a
defense their ability to negotiate reduced rates from certain providers.  The
question that defense invites is whether the postmerger firm is able to bar-
gain down the price by purchasing in higher volume, thereby reducing trans-
action costs, or perhaps by counterbalancing market power in the selling
market.  In those cases, the postmerger firm’s ability to obtain lower input
prices is efficient, and output of the purchased input can be expected to
increase.  By contrast, if the firm is taking advantage of labor market concen-
tration to suppress output further by driving prices down, then the reduced
price is not efficient at all but anticompetitive.291
In United States v. Anthem, Inc., a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit con-
demned a merger of health insurers operating in two concentrated markets,
rejecting as unsubstantiated a proffered efficiency defense that the post-
merger firm would be able to negotiate lower provider rates.292  The court
also observed that if the lower rates were an exercise of monopsony power
they would not constitute a defense293—a position taken by the 2010 Hori-
zontal Merger Guidelines.294  A dissenting judge found the efficiencies
defense to be adequate but also acknowledged the government’s alternative
theory of the case, which was that the postmerger firm would have “monop-
sony power in the upstream market where Anthem-Cigna negotiates provider
rates with hospitals and doctors.”295
Business firm markets for hiring are often just as concentrated, if not
more, than the product markets in which these firms operate.296  One reason
290 See Eleanor Tyler, Justice Dept. Is Going After ‘No-Poach’ Agreements, BLOOMBERG BNA
(Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.bna.com/justice-dept-going-n73014474358/.
291 See Marinescu & Hovenkamp, supra note 280, (manuscript at 3).
292 United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 356, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
293 Id.; cf. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010)
(sustaining complaint that large hospital system and health insurer conspired to suppress
reimbursement rates paid to providers); N.M. Oncology & Hematology Consultants, Ltd. v.
Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 54 F. Supp. 3d 1189 (D.N.M. 2014) (sustaining cancer
treatment facility’s complaint of conspiracy between hospital and insurer to suppress reim-
bursement rates).
294 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49, § 10 (“Cognizable efficien-
cies . . . do not arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or service.”).
295 Anthem, 855 F.3d at 377 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  The district court had not
decided the monopsony issue, and the dissenter would have remanded for that determina-
tion. Id.
296 See Azar et al., supra note 278, at 2.  A related manifestation is that, because of wage
suppression, wages make up a decreasing share of firm output and also of gross domestic
product. See generally Jordan D. Matsudaira, Monopsony in the Low-Wage Labor Market? Evi-
dence From Minimum Nurse Staffing Regulations, 96 REV. ECON. & STAT. 92 (2014); David
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this is so is that the geographic markets in which firms hire are often much
smaller than the markets in which they sell their products.297  For example, a
Silicon Valley tech firm might hire its engineers and other computer special-
ists in a relatively small geographic market, but sell its product nationwide or
even worldwide.  As the Anthem case indicates, the government has not
ignored the problem, but it deserves more attention.298
Is aggressive use of antitrust against anticompetitive wage or salary sup-
pression consistent with the consumer welfare principle?  Yes, provided that
we are talking about true exercises of market power.  The real problem of
antitrust policy toward monopsony is not defending a policy so much as rec-
ognizing it in a particular case.  If firms involved in anticompetitive suppres-
sion of wages have any significant power in the product or service market in
which they sell, then wage suppression that reduces the amount of labor can
be expected to translate into an output reduction in the product market as
well.  As a firm uses less labor it produces less, and if it has market power on
the output side its price will rise.  That would make it a clear case of con-
sumer harm.  While monopoly results in higher priced transactions and
monopsony in lower ones, both tend to result in reduced output.
From a consumer welfare perspective, the harder case occurs when firms
exercising market power for the purchase of labor lack power in the market
in which they sell.  In that case they may still produce less, but in a competi-
tive market, consumers in the product market will not be harmed.  For exam-
ple, a firm might hire locally and hold considerable monopsony power in the
labor market but sell its product nationwide or worldwide in a highly compet-
itive market.299  Here, the “consumer” label needs to be stretched a little, but
not very much.  Every employed person appears on the market as both a
consumer and as a seller of his or her wages.  For the purpose of analyzing
wage suppression agreements, the worker stands in the same position on the
Autor et al., Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 23108, 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23108; David Autor et
al., The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 23396, 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23396.
297 Azar et al., supra note 278, at 7.
298 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49, do include a section on mergers of
powerful buyers.  This section also notes the difference between anticompetitive exercise
of monopsony power and efficient but competitive buying practices.  They then give this
example:
Example 24: Merging Firms A and B are the only two buyers in the relevant
geographic market for an agricultural product.  Their merger will enhance buyer
power and depress the price paid to farmers for this product, causing a transfer of
wealth from farmers to the merged firm and inefficiently reducing supply.  These
effects can arise even if the merger will not lead to any increase in the price
charged by the merged firm for its output.
Id. § 12.
299 These were the facts of Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549
U.S. 312 (2007), which involved predatory buying for a product input.  The defendant
purchased raw hardwood locally but sold finished lumber in a national market in which it
was a competitor.
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sell side as the consumer does on the buy side.  So in this case, the same tools
of economic analysis can be brought to bear.
In sum, the best understanding of consumer welfare is as promoting
markets in which output of both product and labor is as high as competition
permits.  To be sure, not every exercise of market power results in a signifi-
cant output reduction.  For certain goods the elasticity of demand (or sup-
ply) is extremely low, and as a result output may not decline very much in
response to a monopoly price increase.  Typically, these are goods that con-
sumers regard as necessities, or perhaps because the purchase requirement is
set by a third party, and for which no good substitutes are available.  Exam-
ples include pediatric visits, necessary medical procedures, salt, and college
textbooks.300  At least in the short run, a price increase for these results in a
relatively low decline in output.  On the buy side, the evidence suggests that
labor, depending on the profession, is also a low-elasticity good, meaning
that a reduction in wages does not necessarily produce a significant reduc-
tion in supply.301  On the other hand, the correlation between wages and
labor market concentration is strong, indicating that monopsony or oligop-
sony can be inferred from high-concentration levels, just as it is for monopoly
or oligopoly in product markets.302
Antitrust merger policy should also not hesitate to limit acquisitions that
lessen competition in the labor market even though the participants do not
compete in any product market.  This could take antitrust merger policy into
situations whose complexities are largely unresolved.  Take as a completely
hypothetical example a merger between Google, whose principal products
are software, and Intel, whose principal product is processor chips.  One
might assume that the two firms have none or at least few overlapping prod-
ucts, so a merger between them would be considered nonhorizontal and sub-
jected to lenient antitrust treatment.  But on the supply side they may
compete intensely for computer engineers or other highly trained employ-
ees, and for these the geographic market could be local—far smaller than
the worldwide market in which the two firm sells most of their products.  In
that case the merger should be addressed as horizontal and assessed on the
basis of concentration in the labor supply market for the professions in
question.
Some labor suppression cartel cases have acknowledged this, reaching
agreements between firms that compete for the same employees even though
300 E.g., Patrick L. Anderson et al., Price Elasticity of Demand (Nov. 13, 1997) (unpub-
lished handout), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/alada/files/price_elasticity_
of_demand_handout.pdf; see also Reading: Examples of Elastic and Inelastic Demand, LUMEN
LEARNING, https://courses.lumenlearning.com/microeconomics/chapter/reading-exam
ples-of-elastic-and-inelastic-demand/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2018).
301 See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS 134–45
(12th ed. 2016); see also, e.g., Staiger et al., supra note 282. See generally Torberg Falch, The
Elasticity of Labor Supply at the Establishment Level, 28 J. LAB. ECON. 237 (2010); Michael R.
Ransom & David P. Sims, Estimating the Firm’s Labor Supply Curve in a “New Monopsony”
Framework: Schoolteachers in Missouri, 28 J. LAB. ECON. 331 (2010).
302 See Azar et al., supra note 278, at 2.
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they do not compete to any significant extent in the product market.  For
example, California v. eBay, Inc. approved the settlement of an antitrust case
involving an agreement between eBay and Intuit not to hire one another’s
computer engineers and scientists.303  eBay is an online auction broker for
new and used goods of all types.  Intuit is a producer of business and account-
ing software whose principal products include TurboTax and QuickBooks.
eBay incidentally offers new and used copies of Intuit products on its website
when third-party vendors place them there, but that relationship between the
two firms is vertical and very minor.  The firms do not obviously compete in
any product market.  To the extent that they compete for the same category
of employees in the hiring market, however, they are competitors and anti-
trust merger policy should treat them accordingly.  Given that the two firms
can profitably collude in this hiring market, a merger of the two should also
be of competitive concern.
CONCLUSION
This Article began with a historical question about whatever happened
to the antitrust movement.  The short answer is that antitrust grew up.  It
ceased to be the stuff of political banners and loose rhetoric and turned into
a serious discipline, applying defensible legal and empirical techniques to
problems within its range of competence.
The way to repair deficiencies in antitrust law today is not to resort to an
undisciplined set of goals that provide no guidance and could do serious
harm to the economy.  Rather, it is to make ongoing adjustments in our tech-
nical rules of antitrust enforcement which reflect what research and experi-
ence have taught us.
The antitrust laws can reach nearly every form of anticompetitive behav-
ior, provided that they are interpreted flexibly, but this need not entail
throwing out rational evidentiary requirements or accepting expansive theo-
ries of harm without proof.  Further, antitrust tribunals need to avoid reme-
dies that do more harm than good.  Hobbling a large firm is easy; increasing
output and benefitting consumers in the process may be much more
difficult.
One ongoing problem of antitrust enforcement is assessing effective-
ness.  Testing antitrust outcomes can be difficult.  One advantage of the con-
sumer welfare principle applied to merger law is that it gives us a testable
proposition: if the goal of merger policy is to prevent mergers that threaten
reduced output and higher prices, then we can evaluate consummated merg-
ers by that standard and see how we are doing.  One should not minimize the
difficulties.  A few mergers might lead to things such as quality improvements
that are harder to test for, but in general the success of merger enforcement
under the consumer welfare principle is testable and has in fact been widely
tested.  The evidence is troublesome, because it suggests that many mergers
303 California v. eBay, Inc., No. 12-cv-05874, 2014 WL 4273888 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29,
2014).
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that the agencies approved have led to higher prices.304  To the extent that is
true, merger standards need to be revised and continuously reexamined.
Cartel price fixing305 and resale price maintenance are two other prac-
tices that have been subjected to a fair amount of empirical testing, although
in the case of resale price maintenance, one still may need to adjust for dif-
ferences in service quality.306  What all these practices have in common is
observable effects that relate the antitrust rule governing the practice to
resulting prices.
Unfortunately, other areas of antitrust do not lend themselves so readily
to such testing.  How would one test whether the existing predatory pricing
law is underdeterrent?  Or the rule of reason in joint venture cases?  There
are too few cases and they tend to be idiosyncratic.  Devising better testability
needs to be an important piece of technical antitrust’s agenda.  But this fact
hardly places technical antitrust at a disadvantage vis-a`-vis movement anti-
trust.  The grand generalizations of movement antitrust, with its far-flung
expectations and unexamined rhetoric, defy testability.
When it performs well, technical antitrust should be able to promote the
highest output consistent with unmanaged competition.  That in turn will do
everything that antitrust is capable of doing for collateral interests such as full
employment and more egalitarian wealth distribution.
304 See KWOKA, supra note 195, at 76; Hovenkamp, supra note 195, at 716.
305 See generally John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, The Size of Cartel Overcharges: Impli-
cations for U.S. and EU Fining Policies, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 983 (2006) (summarizing stud-
ies); John M. Connor, Price-Fixing Overcharges (Feb. 25, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2400780.
306 See Alexander MacKay & David Aron Smith, The Empirical Effects of Minimum Resale
Price Maintenance (Kilts Booth Marketing Series, Working Paper No. 2-006, 2014), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2513533 (finding some evidence that con-
sumer prices are higher under rule of reason and discussing numerous other studies); see
also Thomas W. Gilligan, The Competitive Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 17 RAND J. ECON.
544 (1986) (finding welfare effects of resale price maintenance vary depending on the
purpose for which it is used); Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evi-
dence From Litigation, 34 J.L. & ECON. 263 (1991) (similar).
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